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TOWARDS A HARMONIZED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK IN THE WAKE OF THE CRISIS 
SHUANGGE WEN

 
ABSTRACT 
Coming in the wake of the current financial crisis, European 
developments in corporate governance have received intensive attention, 
especially during a period when the market volatility of the European 
Union calls its future integrity into question. This paper seeks to contest 
further action from the European Union level towards establishing “a 
harmonized corporate governance framework” with reference to both its 
desirability and practical feasibility. Starting with a critical evaluation of 
the factors underpinning the legitimacy of integration, which questions the 
appeal of “more Europe” in the post-crisis context, the paper casts further 
doubt on the major harmonization methods of corporate governance, 
initially based on arguments grounded in the real world and then drawing 
on theoretical conundrums. Practically, it appears more feasible and 
desirable to aim for an improved variety of governance systems while 
leaving open the possibility of flexibility and national distinctions between 
practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing topic in the realm of corporate governance has been 
the likelihood of rival systems converging towards a single standard 
model. In conjunction with the increasingly globalized economy and 
notable improvements in technology, production, and trading patterns, 
corresponding improvements in the governance of corporations have been 
increasingly called for. Attention has intensified in both the economic and 
legal academic domains regarding the transportability of “best practices” 
of corporate governance.
1
  
 
 
 1. See MAURO F. GUILLÉN, MODELS OF MANAGEMENT: WORK, AUTHORITY, AND 
ORGANIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1994); Michael J. Rubach & Terrence C. Sebora, 
Comparative Corporate Governance: Competitive Implications of an Emerging Convergence, 33 J. 
WORLD BUS. 167 (1998) (providing a historic and comparative perspective of corporate governance 
systems and convergence of these systems in several countries); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper 
Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) 
(arguing that corporate “gatekeepers” were a significant cause of financial distress in the early 2000s); 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 
(2001); Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell, International Corporate Governance, 38 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for 
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1999) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/2
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In Europe, which currently has the most developed model of regional 
integration, a forward-looking harmonized approach to corporate 
governance has been a particular topic of interest. Europe has traditionally 
been an area consisting of a multitude of highly sophisticated national 
corporate governance systems. These systems have developed over time 
and overwhelmingly reflect a variety of distinguished nationally historical, 
cultural, and financial traditions.
2
 The two ideal types of governance 
systems categorized in the orthodox taxonomy of corporate governance—
the Anglo-American “outsider” system of the United Kingdom and the 
Continental “insider” system exemplified by Germany—can also be seen 
as forming the polar extremes of European corporate governance. Each 
type of framework is characterized by different ownership patterns, 
managerial strategies, and structural elements.
3
 
In response to the fast expansion of the European internal market
4
 and 
business transportability, corresponding measures controlling the creation 
of corporate bodies and their behavior have been solicited at the EU law 
level, with particular attention being devoted to the prospect of 
harmonization across countries.
5
 Viewed on a broad spectrum, this 
 
 
[hereinafter Coffee, The Future as History] (discussing the history of corporate governance 
convergence and its likely adoption by global markets). 
 2. See THOMAS CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH 170 (2007); Eur. Comm’n Reflection Group, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future 
of EU Company Law (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n Reflection Group], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf. 
 3. A large amount of literature has made considerable contributions to the development of these 
two corporate governance models. See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera, Deborah E. Rupp, Cynthia A. Williams 
& Jyoti Ganapathi, Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-level Theory of 
Social Changes in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836 (2007); Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez De Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); 
Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-
American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005). In these comparative 
studies, the Anglo-American model is alternatively labeled as the market-oriented model, common law 
model, shareholder-centered model, or liberal model. The Continental model is variously known as the 
bank-oriented model, civil law model, stakeholder-centered model, or coordinated model. See Ruth V. 
Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions 
and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 447, 447 n.1 (2003). 
 4. The original wording was “common market” in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 40 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf. This term 
was replaced by “internal market” following the Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 10, 11, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:0010:0041:EN:PDF. 
 5. Michael J. Rubach & Terrence C. Sebora, supra note 1; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as 
History, supra note 1; Hanno Merkt, European Company Law Reform: Struggling for a More Liberal 
Approach, 1 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 3 (2004); Mathias M. Siems, Convergence, Competition, 
Centros and Conflicts of Law: European Company Law in the 21st Century, 27 EUR. L. REV. 47 
(2002); Paul Omar, In the Wake of the Companies Act 2006: An Assessment of the Potential Impact of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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constitutes an integral part of efforts to achieve the primary Union 
objective of “economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity 
among Member States.”6 In the minds of the drafters of the original Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community (“EEC”), substantial 
harmonization of the rules and regulations governing companies’ 
performance was essential in creating a level playing field for the free 
movement of companies and for the achievement of their primary goal: the 
harmonious development of economic activities within the common 
market.
7
 Much of the opinion in the second half of the last century reached 
a consensus on the necessity of a high degree of sustainable convergence 
by means of “federal” (e.g. European Community (“EC”) level) 
regulations
8
 and a robust harmonization program consisting mainly of 
determinative directives initiated in the late 1960s, covering both company 
law and corporate governance. While this ambitious scheme lost much of 
its impetus in the 1990s due to forceful criticism from corporate 
scholarship and policy-makers in Member States,
9
 the EU has not given up 
on the idea of forming a harmonized corporate governance framework; 
indeed, it has been singled out in particular as one of the Union’s policy 
priorities.  
In an acknowledgement of the difficulty of gaining political consensus 
for large-scale sweeping Union intervention following a seminal report 
from the High Level Group of Experts in 2002, the EU harmonization 
strategy has moved towards a less rigid form and has been marked by an 
 
 
Reforms to Company Law, 20 INT’L COMPANY & COMM. L. REV. 44, 54 (2009); Eur. Comm’n, 
Progress on Financial Services: Ninth Progress Report (2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/inter 
nal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/progress9_en.pdf. 
 6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 
83) 1, 10 [hereinafter TEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ: 
C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF. 
 7. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 2, Mar. 25, 1957 
[hereinafter EEC], available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/ 
treaties_eec_en.htm (official treaty not published); see also EC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 2, at 10.  
 8. John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus Regulatory 
Competition 6 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 54/2005, 2005), available at 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP307.pdf (unofficial working paper source); CATHERINE BARNARD, 
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 6 (2004); Report of 25 March 1998 on 
Progress towards Convergence, COM (1999) 98 final (Mar. 25, 1998), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/ 
4901/1/4901.pdf; VANESSA EDWARDS, EC COMPANY LAW 3–5 (1999). 
 9. It is believed that it is better to leave the main issues regarding company law to the different 
parties’ discretion because of the astonishing rapidity of the modern business environment and the 
undeniable role of the markets. See PAUL L. DAVIES, SARAH WORTHINGTON, LAURENCE CECIL 
BARTLETT GOWER & EVA MICHELER, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 
132 (8th ed. 2008). For views on market efficiency, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1986); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/2
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increasingly broad use of alternative instruments in the form of national 
codes to enable flexibility and mutual recognition among Member States. 
Interestingly, it does not seem that the Union wishes to completely 
abandon its role as supranational legislator in the area of corporate 
governance. As well as the continuing (but much less frequent) 
formulation of directives setting up minimum rules in certain areas at the 
Community level,
10
 a major harmonization initiative was a mandate 
requiring the application of national codes on a “comply-or-explain”11 
basis. For this reason, the EU move towards harmonization since 2002 has 
been termed “procedural harmonization.”12 
Recently, the legitimacy and utility of this procedural harmonization 
approach were again reconsidered in light of the recent economic and debt 
crises, which caused increased doubt about the EU integration process.
13
 
Since the onset of the worldwide recession three years ago, waves of 
economic and debt crises have not only threatened local and regional 
economies, but also brought the existence of the European Union itself—a 
unique regional, economic, and political partnership—to a critical point. In 
the search for a strategy to bring the EU back from the edge of collapse, 
future reforms of corporate governance, particularly those aimed at Union-
wide harmony, have received renewed attention. The Commission is 
planning to put forward new initiatives regarding corporate governance in 
hope of reiterating its commitment to a “strong and successful single 
market.”14 These new initiatives are built on the premise that a harmonious 
framework at the European level will be crucial to ensure necessary 
transparency in governance structure as well as to revive investor 
 
 
 10. The most recent two were Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC in regards to capital 
requirements for the trading book and for re-securitizations and the supervisory review of 
remuneration policies and Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
July 2007 on the Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies. See Council 
Directive 2010/76, 2010 O.J. (L 329) 3, 3–35 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:329:0003:0035:en:PDF; Council Directive 2007/36, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 
17, 17–24 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:184: 
0017:0024:EN:PDF. 
 11. For further discussions on the concept of comply-or-explain, see infra Part IV.C.II. 
 12. Armour, supra note 8, at 5; Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition versus Harmonization in 
European Company Law, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 190–217 
(Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geodin eds., 2001). 
 13. See, e.g., Christian Andres & Erik Theissen, Setting a Fox to Keep the Geese—Does the 
Comply-or-Explain Principle Work?, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 289 (2008). 
 14. Commission Green Paper on The EU Corporate Governance Framework, at 2, COM (2011) 
164 final (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com 
2011-164_en.pdf. 
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confidence and economic development.
15
 Nevertheless, even with the 
rhetoric of an “even closer Union,”16 the end goal of harmonization is not 
well defined or even agreed upon.
17
 Responses from a wide range of 
professional representatives, citizens, and public authorities have also 
shown a generally hostile attitude towards the implementation of further 
governance measures at the EU level, which renders the prospect of 
further harmonization at the Union level unclear.
18
 
At a time of heated discussion about the need for solidarity, this paper 
sets out to contest both the legitimacy and the practical feasibility of 
increased Union action towards a harmonized corporate governance 
framework. Following Part I, Part II of the article provides some history, 
offering an overview of the process of European integration. Part III 
examines the credibility of the factors thought to underpin the EU 
harmonization initiatives, thereby investigating whether a corporate 
governance framework driven by the EU as a “federal” legislator is indeed 
a necessity for the post-crisis environment. In Part IV of the article, the 
attainability of harmonization in corporate governance practices is 
critically discussed by applying close scrutiny to the competence of Union 
level actions. This article finds that neither the traditional top-down 
harmonizing approach, nor the current “procedural harmonization” 
approach characterized by “comply-or-explain,” are likely to achieve a 
harmonized corporate governance framework, and long-standing national 
dynamics in corporate governance have managed to survive and will likely 
persist. 
Finally, Part V draws insights from a theoretical perspective to explain 
the unfeasibility of European harmonization in the realm of corporate 
 
 
 15. Matthew Sparkes, Matthew Holehouse, Andrew Trotman & Rachel Cooper, Debt Crisis: As 
it Happened, THE TELEGRAPH (Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Comments from Jose Manuel Barroso], 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8887896/Debt-crisis-as-it-happened-No 
vember-11-2011.html (quoting Jose Manuel Barroso); see also Eur. Comm’n, Directorate-General for 
Econ. and Fin. Affairs, Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, 7 EUR. 
ECON. (2009) [hereinafter Economic Crisis in Europe], available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy 
_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf; Eur. Comm’n Reflection Group, supra note 2, at 11; 
Fraser Cameron, The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration (Working Paper for the 
Council on Foreign Relations’ Int’l. Insts. & Global Governance Programme, 2010), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/eu/european-union-model-regional-integration/p22935. 
 16. The rhetoric of “an even closer Union” was put forward in the TEU as one of the key 
objectives. See TEU, supra note 6, art. 1. 
 17. JO STEINER & LOMA WOODS, EU LAW 20 (10th ed. 2009). 
 18. See, e.g., Eur. Comm’n, Summary of Responses to the Commission Green Paper on The EU 
Corporate Governance Framework (2011) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n, Summary of Responses], 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ company/docs/modern/20111115-feedback-statement 
_en.pdf; Giandomenico Majone, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: A Response to Professor Michael 
Dougan’s Review of Dilemmas of European Integration, 32 EUR. L. REV. 70 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/2
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governance. This is not only attributable to the flexible nature and blurred 
boundaries of corporate governance as an evolving discipline,
19
 but is also 
owed to the deeply-embedded unique identities and capabilities of national 
corporate governance systems across Europe.
20
 Despite the urgency sensed 
by European legislators to consolidate the frontiers of the EU, rigorous 
theoretical viewpoints and flawed practices continue to oppose further 
Union legislative intervention towards a harmonized corporate governance 
framework.
21
 It appears more desirable and practically feasible to envisage 
a continuing variety of governance systems, which leave open the 
possibility of flexibility and national distinctions between practices. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION 
Whereas most significant changes in Europe over the past sixty years 
were brought about by efforts towards integration, few would disagree 
with the importance of understanding the definition of European 
integration and the various strands of theories and practices characterizing 
the process. 
 Attempts at European unity can be traced back as early as 1464, when 
the Czech King George of Podĕbrady proposed the formation of a league 
of Christian nations to King Louis XI of France.
22
 Following the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, the desire for peace and security in central 
Europe—“a traditional crossroads of all European conflicts”—
predominantly inspired this proposal.
23
 In 1693, an English philosopher, 
William Penn, took and further developed the idea of a United States of 
Europe in his important work Essay towards the Present and Future Peace 
by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates.
24
 
Though the intended effects of his essay of resolving state conflicts did not 
immediately come to fruition, its proposal for establishing a European 
Parliament had a significant influence on almost all European integration 
plans and proposals in the subsequent two centuries. 
 
 
 19. See infra Part V.A. 
 20. See infra Part V.B.  
 21. See infra Parts V.B & VI. 
 22. Vaclay Havel, Dreaming Aloud, in THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE 89, 89–97 (John Coleman 
ed., 1999). 
 23. Id. at 95. 
 24. WILLIAM PENN, AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PEACE OF EUROPE BY THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EUROPEAN DYET, PARLIAMENT OR ESTATES (1693, reprinted in 1983). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In the wake of the Second World War, the impetus towards creating a 
united Europe to eliminate the destructive forces of national chauvinism
25
 
saw the emergence of the Statute on the Council of Europe in 1949. The 
formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”) followed 
soon after, signifying the beginning of contemporary Europeanization.
26
 
The ECSC went beyond intergovernmentalism and established a 
supranational authority whose independent institutions had the power to 
bind its constituent Member States.
27
 Building on the success of the 
ECSC, the Treaty of Rome extended the integration to other economic 
sectors in 1957 with the creation of the European Economic Community 
(“EEC”). The initial decades of Europeanization were chiefly inspired by 
economic concerns, with the aim of removing barriers to trade and 
establishing a common market to enable the harmonious economic 
development of the Member States. It was not until 1992 that full-fledged 
integration efforts permeated the fields of defense and politics. The Treaty 
on European Union (“TEU”), also known as the Maastricht Treaty as it 
was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992, introduced the striking 
“three-pillar” structure, which developed the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and enabled close cooperation in justice and home 
affairs.
28
 As well as the directly applicable provisions of the Treaty 
regulating the four freedoms,
29
 the harmonization of laws between 
Member States is viewed as a necessary instrument for achieving the 
primary Treaty objective of “economic, social and territorial cohesion, and 
solidarity among Member States.”30 The influence of the European Union 
 
 
 25. EUR. UNIV. INST., DOCUMENTS OF THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Walter 
Lipgens ed., 1985); PAUL P. CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 4 
(5th ed. 2011). 
 26. An early conceptualization of this term was offered by Ladrech, as “an incremental process 
of re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the extent that EC political and economic 
dynamics becomes part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.” See Robert 
Ladrech, Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France, 32 J. COMMON 
MARKET STUD. 69, 69 (1994). Over the years, the implications of this term are increasingly 
expanding. See Johan P. Olsen, The Many Faces of Europeanization, 40 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 
921 (2002) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the term). 
 27. CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 25 
 28. The Maastricht Treaty creates the European Union and the so-called “three-pillar” structure, 
consisting of the European Communities, common foreign and security policy (“CFSP”), and police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. See Summaries of EU Legislation: Treaty of Maastricht 
on European Union, EUROPA, available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/ 
treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm (last updated Oct. 15, 2010). 
 29. The “four freedoms” are the cornerstones of the European single market—the free movement 
of people, goods, services and capital. They are now fully enshrined in the EU Treaty. See TEU, supra 
note 6, tit. IV. 
 30. TEU, supra note 6; see also Piet Jan Slot, Harmonization, 21 EUR. L. REV. 378 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss1/2
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has now spread to almost every corner of the world with a momentous 
impact on Member States’ developments in the economic, political, 
sociological, cultural, technological, and ecological domains. 
Although the history of the European Union is characterized by its 
extensive harmonization program in numerous areas including social 
policy, company law, and environmental legislation, less attention is given 
to explaining the precise meaning of harmonization. Harmonization is 
used interchangeably with other terms—for instance, “approximation” in 
Article 114 of the TEU or “cohesion” in Article 174 of the TEU31—to 
denote the same concept. A useful starting point is acknowledging that 
harmonization does not simply mean unification. Unification refers to the 
complete replacement of the legal orders of a Member State with a new 
order adopted at the European level
32
 and is primarily achieved through 
precise and meticulous regulations.
33
 Harmonization, on the other hand, is 
normally aimed at the formation of a common set of rules, and it is 
characterized by directives designed to allow for differentiation by 
Member States contextualizing the Union-level legislative orders into their 
domestic practice, along with the possibility of opting out the program. 
Observing the past six decades of European integration, one could 
contend that it has essentially been a convoluted process involving a 
search for the proper balance along the traditional dichotomy between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.
34
 Supranationalism suggests 
that an authority (in this case, the EU) that stands above the national states 
holds and yields the power and control to achieve harmonization in 
international organizations, and national states may be obliged to act 
against their preferences. In the process of harmonization, the authority 
takes “inter-state relation beyond cooperation into integration, and 
involves some loss of national sovereignty.”35 Intergovernmentalism, 
conversely, emphasizes the central role of Member States in an 
international and organizational context. Their national sovereignty 
 
 
 31. Walter van Gerven, Harmonisation Within and Beyond, in “FROM PARIS TO NICE”—FIFTY 
YEARS OF LEGAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 1 (Martijn van Empel ed., 2003). 
 32. STEINER & WOODS, supra note 17, at 362; D. Vignes, The Harmonization of National 
Legislation and the EEC, 15 EUR. L. REV. 358 (1990); van Gerven, supra note 31, at 1–15. 
 33. Piet Jan Slot, supra note 30, at 379. 
 34. These two competing approaches dominated the study of European integration. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the origin and implications of these two approaches, see IAN BACHE, 
STEPHEN GEORGE & SIMON BULMER, POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ch. 1 (2011).  
 35. NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 558 (6th ed. 
2006). 
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generally remains intact. Integration occurs only when it is in the common 
interests of the states.
36
 
Before the Maastricht Treaty, especially in the early days of the 
Community, supranationalism undoubtedly underpinned the European 
integration process. Many regulations were disguised in the form of 
directives, providing detailed obligations and leaving Member States with 
few powers to regulate at a national level and no room for diversity.
37
 This 
trend is also seen in the fields of company law and corporate governance. 
In the opinion of the Commission, a sweeping harmonization of company 
law on the basis of Article 44(3) is necessary. It had to cover “all 
provisions concerning structure and organs of companies, formation and 
maintenance of its capital, the composition of the profit and loss account, 
the issue of securities, mergers, conversions, liquidations, guarantees 
required in cases of company concentrations, etc.”38 Inevitably, the loss of 
the autonomy of Member States triggered a huge outcry against the 
overarching influence of the Community. An important sign of opposing 
voices from Member States was Brunner v. European Union Treaty,
39
 in 
which the German Federal Constitution Court refused to accept that EU 
law trumped Member States’ constitutional guarantees and further 
highlighted the importance of preserving the quality of a sovereign state in 
its own right, even upon adherence to the Union Treaty. Not surprisingly, 
the full-fledged trend towards harmonization at the EU level gradually fell 
into decline after it lost favor with Member States. 
Seeking to avoid stiff regulatory intervention from the Union, it was 
argued that the ultimate goal of harmonization should be “to strengthen the 
 
 
 36. Id. 
   37. van Gerven, supra note 31, at 1. 
 38. M. Berkhouwer présente son rapport, au nom de la commission du marché intérieur, sur la 
proposition de la Commission de la C.E.E. au Conseil (doc. 10/1964-1965) relative à une directive 
tendant à coordonner, pour les rendre équivalentes, les garanties qui sont exigées, dans les États 
membres, des sociétés au sens de l’article 58 alinéa 2 du traité pour protéger les intérêts tant des 
associés que des tiers (doc. 53). This is from the opinion of the Commission as given in the report 
drawn up by C. Berkhouwer on behalf of the Commission for the internal market regarding the 
proposal of the Commission of the EEC to the Council (document 10/1964–1965) for a directive 
concerning the coordination of the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and 
others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of Article 48(2) ex 58(2) of 
the Treaty with a view to making such safeguards equivalent. This is located in the European 
Parliament Session (in years 1966–1967) dated May 9, 1966, document 53 at 7, translated and quoted 
in Jan Wouters, Corporate Law, in “FROM PARIS TO NICE”—FIFTY YEARS OF LEGAL INTEGRATION IN 
EUROPE 33, 33–74 (Martijn van Empel ed., 2003). 
 39. Brunner v. The European Union Treaty, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
[BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155, English translations at 
[1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (Ger.) (unofficial English translation available at http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic 
.es/euroconstitution/library/Brunner_Sentence.pdf). 
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common legal heritage of Europe (and) not to strangle its diversity.”40 This 
view became relevant at the Union level after the Cassis de Dijon 
judgment
41
 shed new light on national differences in the course of 
harmonization, especially on the construction of the mutual recognition 
principle for the free movement of goods. The TEU (the Maastricht 
Treaty)
42
 evidenced the movement of EU harmonization efforts away from 
the traditional supranationalism of the Union with the introduction of the 
subsidiarity and proportionality principles. Today, these are enshrined in 
Article 5 of the TEU, prescribing that the Union does not enjoy full 
competence but may only act within a system of attributed competences 
and objectives.
43
 From this point of view, Union harmonization may not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of the Treaty. Where 
there is joint competence, the Community might only legislate “if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and 
local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.”44 
A number of contradictory views on the degree of leeway that Member 
States should enjoy have also led to the appearance of a variety of 
harmonization methods over the years, which confusingly do not follow a 
fixed pattern and further complicate the blueprint for a harmonious EU. 
Following Slot’s influential taxonomy,45 several major modes may be 
mapped out when examining the rules and standards at the Union level. 
These modes include:
 
(1) Total Harmonization, where no derogation is 
allowed from Member States except for safeguard measures; (2) Optional 
Harmonization, where a directive provides an option to follow either the 
 
 
 40. WALTER VAN GERVEN, JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 
ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW, at v (2d ed. 2000). 
 41. Communication from the Commission Concerning the Consequences of the Judgment Given 
by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (‘Casis de Dijon’), 1980 O.J. (C 256) 2, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1980:256:0002:0003:EN: PDF. 
 42. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 (The Maastricht Treaty). 
 43. These two principles are fundamental to the functioning of the European Union and to the 
division of competences between the Union and the Member States. The first principle states: 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local 
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.  
TEU, supra note 6, art. 5(3)–(4). The second principle adds, “Under the principle of proportionality, 
the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the Treaties.” Id. 
 44. TEU, supra note 6, art. 5(3). 
 45. Piet Jan Slot, supra note 30, at 380–83. 
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harmonized rules or the national rules; (3) Partial Harmonization, which 
employs two sets of rules and generally requires cross-border transactions 
to be subject to Union rules; (4) Minimum Harmonization, where 
minimum rules apply to all Member States, although they may 
individually or jointly implement more stringent rules; (5) Alternative 
Harmonization, where Member States are allowed to choose between 
alternative methods; and (6) Mutual Recognition, where Member States 
are required to recognize each other’s rules and control.46 As will be 
presented, the process of establishing a harmonized corporate governance 
framework has been complicated by the cumulative use of these methods, 
raising considerable doubts about the ambit and extent of necessary future 
regulatory changes. 
III. CONTESTING THE LEGITIMACY OF EU CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
HARMONIZATION: MOTIVATIONS UNDERLYING CONVERGENCE 
A. The Single Market and Corporate Mobility 
The history of corporate law and corporate governance demonstrates 
the predominance of two factors—economic needs and cycles of financial 
collapse—in stirring up public debate and developments in the field of 
corporate governance, with a major point of concern being the 
harmonization of governance models.
47
 From a wider socio-economic 
perspective, pressure from globalization, mainly in the form of economic 
and financial integration and the development of international principles 
and codes, is driving institutions and nations to reconfigure their corporate 
governance systems to adapt to changes in the wider context and achieve 
convergence through commonly-recognized “best practices.”48 
Meanwhile, a harmonized system of governance structures is also seen as 
essential to level the playing fields for businesses in light of growing 
economic and financial linkages and integrated market mechanisms among 
nations.
49
 
 
 
 46. Id.; see also STEINER & WOODS, supra note 17, at 360–68. 
 47. See Klaus J. Hopt, Modern Company Law and Capital Market Problems: Improving 
European Corporate Governance after Enron, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 221 (2003); CLARKE, supra note 2. 
 48. Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization, Convergence, and History, 56 J. ECON. HISTORY 277 
(1996); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION DEVELOPMENT (OECD), PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernance 
principles/31557724.pdf. 
 49. See, e.g., WORLD BANK & OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION (1999), available at http://www.sovereignglobal.com/media/framework_for_impleme 
nation.pdf; IRE M. MILLSTEIN, MICHEL ALBERT, SIR ADRIAN CADBURY, ROBERT E. DENHAM, DIETER 
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In the complex landscape of European regional integration, a uniform 
governance framework for corporations has traditionally been at the center 
of the extensive harmonization program and is regarded as essential for the 
completion of the common market.
50
 Community legislators have viewed 
harmonization as an essential means of filling the gaps between the 
directly applicable provisions of the Treaty pertinent to economic 
integration from the beginning. In all instances where diversities between 
national rules and regulations could affect the functioning of the common 
market, harmonization is deemed necessary and placed on the top of the 
agenda.
51
 With the power vested under Articles 94 and 95 of the EC 
Treaty (now Article 114 of the TEU), an extensive body of law was 
developed by the Council for the approximation of laws, regulations, or 
administrative provisions of the Member States insofar as they directly 
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market. In the eyes 
of the original EC Treaty drafters, a substantive mandatory harmonization 
program across the realms of company law and corporate governance was 
indispensable in realizing their primary policy goal. The variety of 
national rules concerning corporate governance were presented as 
increased transaction costs and distorted trade and competition orders in 
cross-border activities, which impeded the process of establishing an 
integrated market.
52
 A report of the European Commission found that 
“[h]armonisation of the rules relating to company law and corporate 
governance, as well as to accounting and auditing, is essential for creating 
a Single Market for Financial Services and products.”53  
In addition to the vision of establishing the common market, the basis 
of many company law directives is enshrined in Article 50(2)(g) of the 
TEU (previously Article 44(3)(g) of the EC Treaty). Article 50(2)(g) 
requires the Council and the Commission to attain freedom of 
establishment by “coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are 
required by Member States of companies or firms within the meaning of 
the second paragraph of Article 54 (ex Article 48) with a view to making 
 
 
FEDDERSEN & NOBUO TATEISI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS AND 
ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MARKETS: A REPORT TO THE OECD BY THE BUSINESS SECTOR 
ADVISORY GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15 (1998), available at http://www.keepeek.com/ 
Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/industry-and-services/corporate-governance-improving-competitiveness 
-and-access-to-capital-in-global-markets_9789264162709-en. 
 50. Armour, supra note 8, at 6; BARNARD, supra note 8. 
 51. Piet Jan Slot, supra note 30, at 379. 
 52. Armour, supra note 8, at 6; BARNARD, supra note 8. 
 53. Company Law & Corporate Governance, Eur. Comm’n, available at http://ec.europa.eu/inter 
nal_market/company/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2013).  
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such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community.”54 It was hoped 
that regulatory harmonization in the field of company law would give rise 
to increasing corporate mobility and freedom of establishment so that 
companies based in one Member State could easily penetrate the markets 
of other Member States.
55
 
Despite these ostensibly sound policy expectations, the reality is that 
little empirical evidence exists to demonstrate that Member States and 
others were suffering in the EU single market due to the lack of 
harmonized company laws and corporate governance rules.
56
 This 
contradicts the arguments in favor of utilizing European corporate 
governance harmonization to establish and promote the single market. 
From a legal perspective, the presence of irreconcilable differences 
between the development of the internal market and limited progress 
towards corporate governance convergence further suggests that the 
impact of a harmonized corporate governance model on economic 
integration and corporate mobility might not be as overwhelming as 
convergence optimists imply. On the basis of Article 3 of the Treaty of the 
European Union and relevant articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union,
57
 great achievements were seen on the basis of the 
single market program, particularly the impressive realization of a 
common market for goods.
58
 In the company law field, the principal 
function of the internal market in terms of the free establishment of 
companies is largely attained in practice. The application sphere of the 
real-seat doctrine has been significantly constrained, particularly since the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) decision in Centros.59 The freedom to 
choose the binding governance system by newly-formed corporations in 
the EU successfully facilitates easy incorporation and free establishment 
of companies. Recent ECJ cases after Centros further support the EU’s 
inclination toward the freedom of movement of corporations by pressing 
Member States to recognize the legitimacy of companies chartered in other 
Member States.
60
 
 
 
 54. TEU, supra note 6, art. 50(2)(g). 
 55. With regard to corporate mobility, the main provision of this source of law is contained in the 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 49, Mar. 30, 2010, 
2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 67 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF. 
 56. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 9. 
 57. TFEU, arts. 21, 26, 28, 29, 114, 115. 
 58. Majone, supra note 18. 
 59. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. 
 60. See, e.g., Case C-208/00, Úberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement 
GmbH, 2005 1 W.L.R. 315, 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (2005); Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en 
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Although legal and economic transitions have progressed to a relatively 
advanced level with regard to the development of the internal market and 
the achievement of free establishment of companies, there is still a highly 
fragmented landscape in the realm of corporate governance consisting of 
several tiers of integration.
61
 Currently enacted EU company laws are 
characterized by their “salami” progression: a number of disparate areas 
are covered, most of which relate to security market regulations and issues 
facilitating cross-border businesses, such as capital maintenance,
62
 the 
audit of accounts,
63
 and the standardization of company registration.
64
 
However, core areas of corporate governance, such as company 
management and company structures, are either left untouched at the 
European level or failed to gain the necessary level of support. A typical 
example is the lack of uniformity in voting rights in publicly traded 
companies regardless of growth in cross-border business activities. 
Contradictory views taken by Member States, reflecting their long-
standing diversified shareholding structures, could not be reconciled at the 
EU level, and eventually Commissioner McCreevy had to declare an 
abrupt end to the discussion of this issue.
65
 An in-depth study also 
revealed that enacted company law harmonization initiatives have become 
highly autonomous; the emphases of many enacted directives are on 
legislative policy aims regarding equivalent protection for shareholders 
and creditors in the markets rather than making a direct contribution to the 
operation of the internal market.
66
 In reality, one can best infer an indirect 
link between the realization of the freedom of establishment of companies 
 
 
Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155, 3 C.M.L.R. 34 (2005); Case C-
411/03, Re Sevic Systems AG, [2006] 2 B.C.L.C. 510. For academic views supporting the 
convergence function of these case laws, see Martin Ebers, Company Law in Member States against 
the Background of Legal Harmonization and Competition between Legal Systems, 11 EUR. REV. 
PRIVATE L. 509, 511 (2003); Paul Rose, EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities After Centros, 
11 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 129 (2001); Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, European 
Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence, 13 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 47, 48 (2002). 
 61. See, e.g., MADS ANDENAS & FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE COMPANY 
LAW 40 (2009); Stefan Grundmann, The Structure of European Company Law: From Crisis to Boom, 
5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 601 (2004); Cameron, supra note 15, at 2; Coffee, Jr., The Future as 
History, supra note 1, at 667–71. 
 62. See Second Council Directive 77/91, 1976 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.euro 
pa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1977:026:0001:0013:EN:PDF. 
 63. Council Directive 2006/43, 2006 O.J. (L 157) 87 (EC), available at http://www.esma.europa 
.eu/system/files/dir_2006_43_EN.pdf.  
 64. See First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 65) 41 (EC), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=DD:I:1968_I:31968L0151:EN:PDF. 
 65. For instance, one-share-one-vote is the standard structure in the UK; but many other Member 
States are accustomed to the rule of proportionality between capital and control. For further 
discussions, see BRENDA HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW 43 (2d ed. 2009). 
 66. See Wouters, supra note 38, at 45. 
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and harmonization in corporate governance. In a recent report, the EU 
finally acknowledged the tenuous link between the operation of the 
internal market and the harmonization of corporate governance, which 
clearly undermines the necessity of future harmonization in this area based 
on the Union’s Treaty foundation: “The different corporate governance 
systems of the Union should not be viewed as an obstacle to free 
enterprise within a single market, but as a treasure trove of different 
solutions to a wide variety of challenges that have been experienced and 
overcome.”67 
B. Cycles of Crises 
Greater than the impact of changing perspectives in the internal market 
economy, concerns originating from the transmission of the financial crisis 
to the real economy tend to stimulate interest in the development of 
corporate governance systems. One well-known example is the Great 
Depression of the late 1920s, which led to the important Berle-Dodd 
debate on the objective of the corporation and the superiority of different 
corporate governance models.
68
 In the new millennium, the collapse of 
Enron revived the stakeholder-end argument in the convergence debate, 
which was diametric to the shareholder-oriented convergence argument 
prevalent in the 1990s.
69
 The recent and on-going financial turmoil has 
further renewed interest in the prospects of convergence in corporate 
governance in the immediate hope that a contingency model may be 
identified and used to predict future crises and achieve business success.
70
 
 
 
 67. Eur. Comm’n Reflection Group, supra note 2, at 11. 
 68. Adolf A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 
(1932); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV 1145 
(1932). 
 69. See THOMAS CLARKE, THEORIES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (2004); CORO 
STRANGBERG, THE CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: THOUGHT—LEADERS STUDY (2005), available at http://www.corostrandberg.com/ 
pdfs/Corporate_Governance.pdf; Williams & Conley, supra note 3; Steen Thomsen, The Convergence 
of Corporate Governance Systems and European and Anglo-American Standards, 4 EUR. BUS. ORG. 
L. REV. 31 (2003); Lucian Cernat, The Emerging European Corporate Governance Model: Anglo-
Saxon, Continental, or Still the Century of Diversity?, 11 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 147 (2004); Simon 
Deakin, The Coming Transformation of Shareholder Value, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 11 
(2005). For the convergence argument in the 1990s, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Convergence and Its 
Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY 83 (2004); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra 
note 1; Denis & McConnell, supra note 1. 
 70. In relevant empirical research, promising results have been suggested regarding the positive 
link between corporate governance and corporate performance. See CLARKE, supra note 2, at 22; 
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Since the summer of 2007, the EU has slipped into and been in the 
midst of the deepest financial turmoil since the 1930s, involving banking 
systems, stock markets, and the flow of credit. As of the writing of this 
article, one of the most influential regional economies, the Eurozone, is 
facing its greatest challenge so far: the depth of the current debt crisis.
71
 
Confronting this catastrophic situation, EU legislators have once more 
decided to resort to the dubious remedy of a coordinated framework, 
which will predictably lead to even more strenuous efforts towards 
integration.
72
 In particular, further legislative action at the EU level to 
develop a synchronized corporate governance framework is seen as crucial 
in achieving this policy priority.
73
 Corporate governance plays a central 
role in running and regulating modern enterprises in globally integrated 
markets, and it is anticipated that a well-coordinated framework will 
overcome the current Eurozone contagion fear as well as create the 
necessary climate for investment and economic revival. As noted, a 
harmonious EU corporate governance framework will “inspire investor 
and lender confidence, spur both domestic and foreign investment, and 
improve corporate competitiveness.”74  
In light of theoretical conundrums plagued with disputes over the 
prospects of convergence, one cannot help but wonder whether the desired 
harmonized corporate governance framework can be achieved at all, let 
alone bring the suggested positive impact in curing the crisis. Although 
much work in the field of corporate governance has examined the prospect 
of convergence,
75
 so far even convergence activists have failed to agree 
about the ends towards which convergence will likely achieve. In the 
1990s, there was an overriding belief in the superiority of the market-
based Anglo-American model that was established through extensive 
 
 
Rebecca Brown & Tue Gørgens, Corporate Governance and Financial Performance in an Australian 
Context 33–34 (Austl. Treasury Working Paper No. 2009-02, Mar. 2009). 
 71. EU “Faces Its Greatest Challenge,” BBC NEWS (Sep. 28, 2011), available at http://www 
.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15087683 (quoting Jose Manuel Barroso). 
 72. Comments from Jose Manuel Barroso, supra note 15; Eur. Comm’n Reflection Group, supra 
note 2, at 8. 
 73. Commission White Paper, supra note 15.  
 74. For further discussion of the necessity of harmonizing EU corporate governance, see INT’L 
FIN. CORP. (IFC), THE EU APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—ESSENTIALS AND RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2008), available at http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/f515ff804af4fc7da869b 
9b94e6f4d75/IFC_EUApproach_Final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
 75. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Economic Performance through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359 
(1994); Rubach & Sebora, supra note 1; L.G. Thomas & Geoffrey Waring, Competing Capitalisms: 
Capital Investment in American, German, and Japanese Firms, 20 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 729 (1999); 
MARCO BECHT & COLIN MAYER, MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 255–69 
(2004). 
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market integration and equity finance development during the 1970s and 
1980s.
76
 This was practically supported by the simultaneous sequence of 
dramatic events occurring in the insider business world, including the 
1997–98 East Asian financial crisis, the burst of the Japanese economic 
bubble, and a series of German corporate scandals. All of these events 
seriously challenged the efficiency of Continental insider systems.
77
 Based 
on these practical phenomena, neo-classical scholars advocated 
convergence toward the Anglo-American shareholder-oriented model, 
promoting the view that this model represents production efficiency, 
increased investment opportunities, and reduced transaction costs.
78
 
Therefore, when globalization and industry competition forces 
corporations in different countries to adopt “best practices” to maintain 
their competitive advantage, the Anglo-American system will eventually 
become the convergent point.
79
  
Things took a dramatic turn, however, in the post-Enron era. Recurring 
corporate failures exposed the inherent instability of the Anglo-American 
system and the perspective of convergence based on a shareholder-
oriented model of governance became a lot less convincing.
80
 Based on 
these changes in governance practice, stakeholding proponents argue in 
favor of the Anglo-American system converging toward the Continental 
model.
81
 The growing exercise of corporate social reporting, the 
 
 
 76. Financial globalization, i.e. the integration of more and more countries into the international 
financial system and the expansion of international markets for money, capital and foreign exchange, 
took off in the 1970s. From the 1980s on, the increase in cross-border holdings of assets outpaced the 
increase in international trade, and financial integration accelerated once more in the 1990s. See Eur. 
Comm’n, The EU Economy 2005 Review: Rising International Economic Integration Opportunities 
and Challenges 19 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication 
433_en.pdf. 
 77. See, e.g., Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 1, at 543; Thomas Clarke, Cycles of 
Crisis and Regulation: The Enduring Agency and Stewardship Problems of Corporate Governance, 12 
CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 153, 156–57 (2004).  
 78. One major argument supporting the efficiency of the Anglo-American regime is as follows: 
dispersed shareholdings mean that shareholders’ wealth depends on more diversified portfolios of 
investments (held directly or through institutions such as pension funds and mutual funds) than 
shareholders in a closed regime with concentrated ownership. Since the risk of a diversified portfolio 
is lower than that of a concentrated one, shareholders require lower return in relation to the risk. This 
in turn lowers the cost of capital faced by corporations and makes capital for risky ventures more 
available, particularly in the circumstance of global capital market integration. See Raghuam G. Rajan 
& Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century, 69 
J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003); Vihang Errunza & Etienne Losq, International Asset Pricing Under Mild 
Segmentation: Theory and Test, 40 J. FIN. 105 (1985); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1. 
 79. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1; see also MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE 
FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2000). 
 80. See, e.g., Williams & Conley, supra note 3; Thomsen, supra note 69. 
 81. See, e.g., Williams & Conley, supra note 3; Thomsen, supra note 69; Strangberg, supra note 
69; Deakin, supra note 69. For differences between the Continental model and the Anglo-American 
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widespread adoption of executive stock options which reintegrate 
ownership and control,
82
 and the rising significance of human capital
83
 in 
Anglo-American corporate governance have all been suggested as 
indicating convergence away from the shareholder-oriented model and 
toward Continental pluralism. 
Disputing both convergence points suggested above, the cross-
reference hypothesis espouses the equal competitive advantages possessed 
by the two ideal models.
84
 Proponents suggest that past business cycles 
provide evidence that neither model outperforms the other at all times.
85
 It 
is argued that global and regional competition will give rise to the 
emergence of a hybrid model characterized by the competitive features of 
both systems—or, in simple terms, a coordinated system of “best 
practices.” In practice, harmonization movements at the EU level have 
thus far attempted to shape a mutual pattern consisting of “best practices” 
from both the Anglo-American and Continental models.
86
 Additionally, 
several multilateral bodies also encourage hybrid convergence by urging 
the adoption of common standards.
87
 However, judging from previous 
theoretical developments, one begins to wonder whether this approach can 
withstand closer scrutiny on the grounds that currently recognized “best 
practices” are not able to embrace and predict all possible future 
variations. For example, although the meteoric rise in executive pay was 
explained and recommended during the 1990s as a reliable incentive 
scheme supported by the long-lived bull market,
88
 in the wake of the crises 
 
 
model, see supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 82. Thomsen, supra note 69. 
 83. Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: Prospects for 
Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5 (2001). 
 84. “[T]his cross reference hypothesis implies that global competition will cause the emergence 
of a hybrid best practice. It also suggests that we should assume in the meantime that the market and 
blockholder systems possess equal competitive fitness.” William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, 
Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: the Case Against Global Cross 
Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 213, 218 (1999). For hybrid convergence arguments, see 
Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany, 10 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 142 (1994); Steven N. Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of 
Japan and the U.S., 102 J. POL. ECON. 510 (1994). 
 85. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 84, at 218–19. 
 86. E.g., Friedrich Kübler, A Shifting Paradigm of European Company Law?, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 219 (2005); Cernat, supra note 69. 
 87. Tarun Khanna, Joe Kogan & Krishna Palepu, Globalisation and Similarities in Corporate 
Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 69, 71 (2006); see, e.g., OECD, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN OECD MEMBER COUNTRIES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS, 
DAFFE/CA/CG (2000), available at http://www.cgscenter.org/library/OECDStudiesonCorpGov/CG% 
20inOECD%20MemberCountries.pdf; WORLD BANK & OECD, supra note 49. 
 88. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 283 (2005); CLARKE, supra note 2, at 77; Kevin Murphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every 
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over the past ten years, this strategy is now seen as extravagant and a 
major contributory factor in managers’ excessive risk-taking practices and 
undue concentration on short-termism.
89
 It is beyond argument that 
governance is more of a social creation than a natural occurrence. The 
astonishing rapidity of developments in the business world prevents one 
all-embracing governance approach because this would act to constrain 
future possibilities by current practices and insights.
90
  
The best of all possible worlds, in the views of some commentators, 
would be an integrated system comprising core rules and values as an 
irreducible minimum, “but no more than can be justified as universally 
applicable.”91 This thought underpinned the EU minimum harmonization 
trend, which commenced with the Single European Act and remained 
particularly prevalent since Maastricht, with its advantages of allowing 
flexibility and diversity in the regulatory system.
92
 From the point of view 
of strong opposing voices, however, one might argue that with the desired 
end result of harmonization still unclear in the field of corporate 
governance, even this minimum harmonization is not a task that can be 
achieved in the short-term. Furthermore, such a minimum standard-
composed framework, within which none of the Member States may fall, 
is pragmatically equal to welcoming the continuation of diversified 
standards above a baseline. This, in turn, may end up undermining rather 
than reinforcing efforts towards harmonization.
93
  
IV. PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY OF EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
HARMONIZATION 
A. The Blurred Borders of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance, being a contextual construct, is strongly shaped 
by local forces and institutional embeddedness.
94
 Notwithstanding the 
 
 
Nickel They Get, 64 HARV. BUS. REV. 125 (1986). 
 89. HOUSE OF COMMONS TREASURY COMM., BANKING CRISIS: REFORMING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND PAY IN THE CITY—NINTH REPORT OF SESSION 2008–09, at 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/519/ 519.pdf; Christian Plath, 
Corporate Governance in the Credit Crisis: Key Considerations for Investors, MOODY’S INVESTOR 
SERV., at 3 (Nov. 20, 2008); ASS’N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, CLIMBING OUT OF THE 
CREDIT CRUNCH 4 (2008), available at http://www2.accaglo bal.com/pdfs/credit_crunch.pdf. 
 90. John Carver, A Case for Global Convergence Theory: Practitioners Avoid It, Academics 
Narrow It, The World Needs It, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 149, 151 (2010). 
 91. Id. 
 92. STEINER & WOODS, supra note 17, at 368. 
 93. Id.  
 94. E.g., Toru Yoshikawa & Abdul A. Rasheed, Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical 
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growing attention paid to corporate governance issues, practical diversities 
among the developed capitalist economies have so far defied a common 
definition of corporate governance, further emphasizing the thorny process 
of harmonization. In its broadest sense, corporate governance is crucial to 
the realization of macro-economic and social goals and is seen as 
embracing both the internal governing structures of a corporation and the 
external forces affecting corporate practice.
95
 One prominent example is 
the World Bank’s definition of corporate governance as “the organizations 
and rules that affect expectations about the exercise of control of resources 
in firms.”96 However, under most business circumstances, especially in 
direct association in the business context, this term is commonly 
delineated in a narrow mode and refers to the internal structure and 
operation of a corporation’s decision-making practices.97 Ownership and 
control are commonly recognized as central themes of corporate 
governance. “Ownership” signals the legal allocation of cash flow rights, 
and “control” indicates the ways in which legal rules and social norms 
interact to establish and maintain the balance of power among 
constituency groups, including shareholders, creditors, and employees.
98
  
Within the European Union, the understanding of corporate governance 
becomes more divergent on closer inspection, with differing 
interpretations influenced by the diverse purposes of corporations. At one 
polar extreme is the shareholder value orientation principle, which is 
honored by a number of Member States.
99
 This approach requires a 
company to maximize the interests of its shareholders ahead of any other 
party who might have claims against the company.
100
 Corporate 
 
 
Review and Future Directions, 17 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 388 (2009); CLARKE, supra note 2. 
 95. See, e.g., WORLD BANK & OECD, supra note 49, at vi (The definition offered by Sir Cadbury 
in 2000: “Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social 
goals and between individual and communal goals. . . . The aim is to align as nearly as possible the 
interests of individuals, corporations and society.”).  
 96. WORLD BANK, BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS: WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2002, at 55 (2002). 
 97. Jeswald Salacuse, Corporate Governance in the New Century, 25 COMPANY LAW 69 (2004). 
 98. See Simon Deakin, Richard Hobbs, Suzanne J. Konzelmann & Frank Wilkinson, Anglo-
American Corporate Governance and the Employment Relationship: A Case to Answer?, 4 SOC.-
ECON. REV. 155, 156 (2006). 
 99. The shareholder value principle is alternatively referred to as the shareholder primacy 
principle or the shareholder wealth maximization norm. See Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the 
Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s “Enlightened Shareholder Value 
Approach,” 29 SYDNEY L. REV. 577 (2009).  
 100. Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defence of the Shareholder Wealth Maximisation 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1423 (1993); Mark J. Roe, The 
Shareholder Wealth Maximisation Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063 
(2001). 
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governance systems in these countries, led by the United Kingdom, are 
arranged to focus on “deal[ing] with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment.”101 In the UK, the evolution of definitions of corporate 
governance has faithfully followed the shareholder-oriented route. The 
most influential concept of corporate governance in the UK, initially 
presented in the Cadbury Report, explicitly emphasizes the predominance 
of the principal-agent relationship between shareholders and directors and 
the ultimate objective of profit maximization.
102
 
In stark contrast to these shareholder-oriented systems, the principal 
objective of corporate governance in Continental “insider” systems 
epitomized by Germany is “to ensure the continued existence of the 
enterprise and its sustainable creation of value in conformity with the 
principles of the social market economy (interest of the enterprise).”103 
Corporate governance is therefore defined with an emphasis on 
coordinating the interests of various corporate constituencies, such as “the 
structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties with a stake in the 
firm,”104 or “the process by which corporations are made responsive to the 
rights and wishes of stakeholders.”105 The disputed boundaries of 
corporate governance demonstrate the difficulty of harmonization and 
further inspire controversy as to the best-suited regulatory method. 
Over the past forty years of attempting to eliminate diversity among 
national corporate governance models, the EU has employed a wide range 
of harmonization efforts ranging across almost all fields that have an 
 
 
 101. Andrei Shleifer & Rober Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 102. Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. Boards 
of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The shareholders’ role in 
governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate 
governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the board included setting the company’s 
strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the 
business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, 
regulations and the shareholders in general meeting. Comm. on the Fin. Aspects of Corp. Governance 
& Gee and Co., Report of the Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, ¶ 2.5 (1992) 
[hereinafter COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE REPORT], available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/docu 
ments/cadbury.pdf. This definition was subsequently incorporated by the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s 1998 paper and has had a significant impact on the main attitude of the Company Law 
Reform Steering Group in terms of the shareholder/stakeholder value dispute. See CO. LAW AND 
INVESTIGATIONS DIRECTORATE, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY 9 (1998). 
 103. GOV. COMM’N, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, as amended on May 15, 2012, at 
1 (2012), available at http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/kodex_2012/D_Cor 
Gov_final_May_2012_amendments.pdf. 
 104. M. AOKI, INFORMATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY: 
COMPETITIVENESS IN JAPAN, THE USA, AND THE TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIES 11 (2000). 
 105. Ada Demb & F.-Friedrich Neubauer, The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes, 25 
LONG RANGE PLANNING 9 (1992). 
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impact on corporate performance including company law,
106
 capital 
market law,
107
 securities regulation,
108
 and even the rules governing 
industrial relations.
109
 The process can be split roughly into the traditional 
substantive harmonization by way of EU regulations and directives on 
substantive law and recent procedural harmonization, characterized by 
EU-imposed directives mandating the way of enforcement of national 
codes of practice.
110
 Four decades of Community action, however, do not 
seem to alter the fact that central themes of corporate governance remain 
divergent across Member States. In the following sections, the effects of 
EU harmonization action at different times for the completion of the 
corporate governance framework will be critically assessed, firstly 
grounded in the real world, and then according to a theoretical analysis. 
B. Early Harmonization—Directives on Substantive Law 
Corporate governance was not singled out during the early EU 
harmonizing process, and it remained an integral part of the 
Europeanization of national company laws, which could be traced back to 
the 1960s. This was because corporate governance did not evolve into an 
independent discipline in its own right until around two decades ago when 
it was conceptualized in response to waves of corporate collapses and 
crises.
111
 In the initial stages of harmonization, meticulously-drafted 
directives were mainly employed with a view towards approximating the 
 
 
 106. E.g., the Regulation on the European Company attempt and First Council Directive 68/151, 
1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. 151, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 
31968L0151:EN:HTML; Second Council Directive 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1, available at http://eur-le 
x.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1977:026:0001:0013:EN:PDF; Third Council Directive 
78/855, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 36, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 
=OJ:L:1978:295:0036:0043:EN:PDF; Fourth Council Directive 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1978:222:0011:0031:EN:PDF; 
see infra Part IV.B. for further discussions. 
 107. See, e.g., Council Directive 72/156, 1972 O.J. (L 91) 13 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.euro 
pa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=DD:I:1972_I:31972L0156:EN:PDF; Council Directive 2002/47, 
2002 O.J. (L 168) 43 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CON 
SLEG:2002L0047:20090630:EN:PDF. 
 108. E.g., Council Directive 2007/64, 2007 O.J. (L 319) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa 
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:319:0001:0036:EN:PDF. 
 109. E.g., Council Directive 2009/101, 2009 O.J. (L 258) 11 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.euro 
pa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:258:0011:0019:EN:PDF. 
 110. Wouters, supra note 38, at 33. 
 111. “Corporate governance has only recently emerged as a discipline in its own right, although 
the strands of political economy it embraces stretch back through centuries.” WORLD BANK & OECD, 
supra note 49, at 1; see also CLARKE, supra note 2, at 8; HANNIGAN, supra note 65, at 41 (“Corporate 
governance is a term much in use in the past decade and it can mean different things depending on the 
context.”). 
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national laws of Member States. This achieved impressive results by the 
end of the 1980s with nine discrete areas being covered by directives.
112
 
Two regulations were also developed around or shortly after this period, 
respectively the Regulation on European Economic Interest Groupings
113
 
and the Regulation on the European Company.
114
 Until the decline of this 
sweeping harmonization trend in the 1990s, however, no substantive 
achievements were made in advancing the convergence of corporate 
governance frameworks. As discussed in the previous section, the EU has 
been attempting to achieve an integration of features from both 
governance models, but most directives were based in the legal systems of 
only a few Member States. Coupled with the fact that early directives were 
often determinative with no room for national derogation, processes of 
setting up Community-level standards on corporate governance with a 
view towards total harmonization has turned out to be extremely harsh and 
difficult in the face of opposing voices from Member States with different 
systems.  
The depressing fate of the proposed Fifth Directive,
115
 which was 
originally intended to have an astounding total harmonization of three 
essential areas of corporate governance (legal structure of public limited 
companies, involvement of employees, and potential liability of directors), 
indicates the difficulty of coordinating diverse corporate governance 
practices. The initial draft of the Directive showed considerable German 
influence, recommending the introduction of a compulsory two-tier board 
system.
116
 Not surprisingly, this was immediately overwhelmed by stiff 
opposition from single-board-structured Member States.
117
 Though the 
radical total harmonization method was incrementally supplanted by 
optional harmonization
118
 through substantial compromises in revised 
 
 
 112. These were the First Council Directive 68/151, 1968 O.J. SPEC. ED. 151; Second Council 
Directive 77/91, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1; Third Council Directive 78/855, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 36; Fourth 
Council Directive 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11; Sixth Council Directive 82/891, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47; 
Seventh Council Directive 83/349, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1; Eighth Council Directive 84/253, 1984 O.J. (L 
126) 20; Eleventh Council Directive 89/666, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 36; and Twelfth Council Directive 
89/667, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 40.  
 113. Council Regulation 85/2137/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 199) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31985R2137:en:HTML. 
 114. Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa 
.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:294:0001:0021:en:PDF. 
 115. The Fifth Directive was first drafted in 1972 and subsequently revised in 1983 and 1989. See 
Cernat, supra note 69, at 157. 
 116. Janice Dine, Implications for the United Kingdom of the EC Fifth Directive, 38 INT’L COMP. 
L. Q. 547, 547 (1989). 
 117. Id. at 556. 
 118. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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versions, e.g. permission to adopt a “one-tier” board system of 
management, the likely outcome of the Directive’s intervention in key 
areas of corporate management still remained unacceptable to businesses 
and Member States, and it has never been enacted.
119
 Although the board 
of directors is the central organ performing corporate governance, its 
structure and operation have never occupied the harmonization initiatives 
of the Commission since.  
As was the case for the Fifth Directive, all progress to introduce a 
unique form of legal entity at the European level—the European Company 
(known by the Latin term “Societas Europaea” or SE)—was blocked for a 
long time,
120
 and its final version made a significant compromise on the 
issue of board structures. Notwithstanding the fact that the SE regulation is 
intended to release companies from different national legal systems so that 
they might operate their business on a Community scale, there is hardly 
any indication of an overarching vision on this key corporate governance 
matter, and both single tier and two-tier structures are permitted for 
structuring and managing SEs.
121
 Even with this significant leeway, this 
harmonizing measure to create a pan-European business form has so far 
proved to be very disappointing. It took almost forty years for the SE to 
become a business reality, and its influence in harmonizing domestic 
corporate practice is minimal; in the past decades only 1029 interests were 
registered within the whole European Union.
122
 Deep-rooted diversities in 
values, traditions, and priorities among Member States have prevented 
their companies from adopting a singular form, and thus have further 
impeded the European Company Statute
123
 in its attempt to challenge 
Member States’ long-established traditions of corporate control. A recent 
survey reveals that only slightly more than 12% of UK companies would 
 
 
 119. See Eur. Parliament, Fact Sheets: Company Law (Jan. 18, 2000), http://www.europarl.europa 
.eu/factsheets/3_4_2_en.htm (“Adoption of the third proposal for a fifth directive in 1991 on the 
structure of public limited liability companies and the powers and obligations of their bodies has been 
blocked because of its provisions on worker participation.”). 
 120. Early European convergence effort in the realm of company law and corporate governance 
could be traced back to the early 1970s, when the EU attempted to create a harmonized corporate 
governance system above domestic regimes by enforcing the statute for a European Company. 
Memorandum from Gregory Jackson to RIETI Int’l Symp., Regional Integration and the Diversity of 
Corporate Governance: Some Lessons from European Integration 5 (Apr. 22–23, 2002), available at 
http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/events/02042201/pdf/jackson_1.pdf. 
 121. Council Regulation 2157/2001, supra note 114, art. 38. 
 122. ETUI, European Company (SE) Database, http://ecdb.worker-participation.eu/ (last updated 
Jan. 6, 2012). 
 123. See Council Regulation 2157/2001, supra note 114. 
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even consider adopting the European Company model, let alone put it into 
action.
124
 
Recognizing the difficulty of imposing strict, rigid rules, directives 
after the 1980s were increasingly designed to allow for greater flexibility 
at the national level.
125
 Directives aiming for optional and minimal 
harmonization have since become major strands. Member States can 
choose to go beyond these directive standards in their domestic 
regulations, or they may opt out of provisions that conflict with their 
existing regulatory systems. From a different perspective, this also creates 
the possibility that key differences between the two distinct corporate 
governance models may continue to be preserved if Member States choose 
to opt out of relevant harmonizing provisions. It has subsequently become 
common practice in Member States for national regulators to develop their 
own systems to govern the internal affairs of companies, and European 
directives are only cautiously accepted when the regulators perceive the 
urgency of borrowing effective regulatory techniques to make their 
jurisdiction more competitive.
126
 
To use the example of the Takeovers Directive,
127
 despite the fact that 
the Directive only contains minimum requirements in the field, its 
implementation has been strongly opposed by Continental-system Member 
States, such as Germany, due to their desire to preserve their national 
characteristics.
128
 A number of basic features of the German corporate 
governance system effectively impede the growth of takeover practices 
and the development of any framework enhancing them, including the 
concentrated ownership structure that greatly reduces the vulnerability of 
corporations to takeovers, undeveloped takeover markets, and well-
structured employee participation in governance. The incompatibility of 
these national elements, therefore, became a major factor influencing the 
hostility of Germany towards the Directive. In 1995, under the 
requirement of integrating its national system into the European unified 
 
 
 124. A. Bibby, Trials of a European Trailblazer, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/1/7f95f656-a13f-11d9-95e5-00000e2511c8.html#axzz27OGvOLoE. 
 125. Until the end of 1974, thirty out of a total of seventy acts involving harmonization of laws 
embodied total harmonization. Since then, total harmonization has been restricted to areas of product 
standards. Piet Jan Slot, supra note 30, at 381. 
 126. See Eddy Wymeersch, Company Law in Turmoil and the Way to ‘Global Company Practice,’ 
3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 283, 291 (2003). 
 127. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:142:0012:0023:EN:PDF. 
 128. See Mathias M. Siems, The Rules on Conflict of Laws in the European Takeover Directive, 4 
EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 458, 460 (2004); cf. Scott Mitnick, Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions in 
Europe: Reforming Barriers to Takeovers, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 683, 699 (2001). 
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takeover regime, a voluntary takeover code was implemented in Germany. 
Because of the lack of sanctioning power from the Takeover Commission, 
only 540 of the 933 listed companies participated in this Takeover 
Code.
129
 On July 14, 2006, the Implementation Act amending the German 
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (“WpÜG”) was put into force to 
implement Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids.
130
 However, German 
listed companies are entitled to choose existing German rules rather than 
following the more restrictive European rules regarding mandatory bid and 
board neutrality.
131
 The possibility of circumventing these key rules 
practically becomes the biggest poison pill of all and further demonstrates 
the Directive’s disappointing influence on harmonization.132  
The very nature of optional harmonization also raises inevitable doubts 
about the strength of these directives in approximating Member States’ 
laws. After these directives eventually get the necessary level of support, 
the finalized versions are generally weak and compromised, which 
severely reduces their effectiveness with respect to their initial goals for 
harmonization. Again, take the implementation of the Takeovers Directive 
as an example. This was intended to introduce a hallmark of Anglo-
American shareholder-oriented capitalism—takeover practice—into the 
European system.
133
 Many of the principles recommended by the 
Directive, such as focusing on disciplining the management of listed 
companies and protecting shareholders’ exclusive rights, have long been 
 
 
 129. Gregory Jackson, Regional Integration and the Diversity of Corporate Governance: Some 
Lessons from European Integration, RIETI, at 9 (Apr. 22–23, 2002), http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/events/ 
02042201/jackson_1.pdf. 
 130. HILDEGARD ZIEMONS, JOCHEN SCHLOTTER & KARSTEN HILMER, COMMON LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR TAKEOVER BIDS IN EUROPE 164–89 (2010). 
 131. According to Article 12 of the Directive, Member States are offered the right not to require 
companies whose registered offices are in their territory to comply with Article 9 and Article 11, 
which enshrine the board neutrality and the mandatory bid principle. See Council Directive 2004/25, 
supra note 128. See also Vanessa Edwards, The Directive on Takeover Bids – Not Worth the Paper It’s 
Written on?, 1 EUR. COMP. FIN. L. REV. 416, 435 (2004) 
 132. See G Maier-Reimer, Protection against Hostile Takeovers in Germany: Banks and 
Limitations on Voting Rights, in EUROPEAN TAKEOVERS: LAW AND PRACTICE 242 (1992); 
FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE: IMPLEMENTATION IN GERMANY 
(2006), available at http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/The%20Takeover 
%20Directive%20implementation%20in%20Germany.pdf.  
 133. It was suggested that the prevalence of family- and bank-controlled companies in many 
Continental countries was due to a lack of appropriate protection for minority shareholders and strong 
anti-takeover devices. See Cernat, supra note 69, at 160; La Porta et al., supra note 3. Takeover 
practice has been commonly agreed to be a significant contributor to shareholder value orientation by 
putting a floor under board performance. P. REDMOND, PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
CORPORATIONS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INQUIRY INTO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2005); PAUL 
L. DAVIES, INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY LAW 212 (2002). 
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practiced in the UK where takeover activity has historically flourished.
134
 
The Directive, as it was originally proposed, attempted to enhance 
employee participation in takeover bids, which is strongly Continental in 
character. Of the fifteen amendments introduced by the EU regarding the 
Takeovers Directive, five were related to the introduction of participatory 
rights for workers in the takeover process.
135
 Despite its ambitious aims, 
after more than ten years of debate and intense argument, the Directive 
eventually reached its final form as a product of political compromise 
between Member States. It is clear that the main aim of the Directive, i.e., 
to offer equal treatment to shareholders throughout the European 
Community, can be easily circumvented by Member States. In the 
Directive, Article 9, which requires the target company’s board to remain 
neutral in the bid, and Article 11, which aims to break through various pre-
bid obstacles to takeovers, are considered to be the key provisions—“the 
core of this Directive”136—offering shareholder protection by restricting 
the rights of the target company board to frustrate a bid without 
shareholder approval.
137
 Nevertheless, according to Article 12 of the 
Directive, which was added as a last-minute political compromise,
138
 
Member States are offered the right not to require companies whose 
registered offices are in their territory to comply with Article 9 and Article 
11. By empowering Member States to maintain their national takeover 
regulatory features and allowing them circumvent those two key 
provisions, the Directive lacks sufficient force to approximate laws and 
practices across Member States. In addition, the implementation of the 
minimum bid requirement in the Directive greatly increases the difficulty 
of launching a takeover bid under the Directive. This potentially restricts 
the Directive’s intended result of increasing cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, which were thought to be the main vehicle for diluting 
concentrated ownership in Continental Europe.
139
 
Viewed from a broader perspective, this legal approximation practice 
in corporate governance also reveals the dark side of EU harmonization 
via the vertical imposition of laws—destructively cutting through areas of 
domestic law. Directives are notorious for their fragmentary nature; each 
 
 
 134. See, e.g., Siems, supra note 128; Edwards, supra note 133, at 439. 
 135. EUR. COUNCIL, AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE STATUTE FOR A 
EUROPEAN COMPANY—GUIDELINES FOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT (2000).  
 136. Siems, supra note 128, at 460. 
 137. Edwards, supra note 133, at 435. 
 138. Luca Enriques, The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Directive: Harmonization without 
Foundation, 1 EUR. COMP. FIN. L. REV. 440, 441 (2004). 
 139. Cernat, supra note 69, at 160. 
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only covers one particular topic and applies to restricted forms of 
businesses. Most would agree that harmonization through Community 
directives, even when smoothly implemented, can only influence the 
Member State’s internal laws that fall within the Community jurisdiction, 
mainly cross-border issues, and must leave intact other areas of domestic 
law despite the fact that they are dealing with similar issues.
140
 This 
undermines the goal of harmonization and will likely result in further 
diversity at the national level. 
C. Current Procedural Harmonization: The Code-based Approach and 
Comply-or-Explain 
1. The Background of Procedural Harmonization 
Recognizing many Member States’ calls for more flexibility, a 
combination of legislation and soft law enabling a “bottom-up” 
convergence and a broader use of alternative instruments to primary 
legislation have been stated as a main theme of EU action on corporate 
governance in the new millennium. It is suggested that a harmonized 
framework should be achieved over time via “a certain coordination” of 
national codes of practices based on “best practices,” reflecting the 
tremendous growth in voluntary codes and guidelines in Member States 
during the past few decades.
141
 Compared to traditional directives, which 
produced “a certain ‘petrifaction”’142 of corporate performances, these 
corporate governance codes are generally developed on a national basis 
and “bring a firm considerable legitimacy”143 by reflecting what public or 
private organizations consider to be best practices. As described by the 
recent comprehensive EU report on corporate governance codes, “[t]he 
codes—together with market pressures—may serve as a converging force, 
by focusing attention and discussion on governance issues, articulating 
 
 
 140. See van Gerven, supra note 31, at 5. 
 141. WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODES RELEVANT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES (2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/corpgov/corp-gov-codes-rpt-part1_en.pdf; THE EU 
APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—ESSENTIALS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 52, 
at 4. Starting from the UK Cadbury Report in 1992, over forty codes have been introduced and 
adopted in Member States over the subsequent ten years. Clarke, supra note 2, at 189. 
 142. THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF CO. LAW EXPERTS, REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF 
COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 
31 (2002) [hereinafter THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf. 
 143. Yoshikawa & Rasheed, supra note 94, at 392. 
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best practice recommendations and encouraging companies to adopt 
them.”144  
When delineating the new code-based approach, sweeping uniform 
European corporate governance code was rejected on the grounds that the 
specificities of Member States’ corporate governance systems are so 
influential that a common EU code would either be meaninglessly 
abstract, or would become a very complex document aiming to be 
inclusive of all contingencies arising from diverse local practices and 
rules, which would not bring significant changes to the current 
landscape.
145
 This accords with the well-accepted idea that European 
integration would work best when it supports, rather than undermines, the 
idiosyncratic values of Member States. To put this in a broader context, 
one might suggest that this code-based approach is one of the many 
responses to the forceful academic criticism of the excessive 
supranationalism exhibited in early Union harmonization practice.
146
 
Indeed, few would now disagree that a positive interventionist role should 
only be assumed by the Union in a cautious fashion, when its superiority 
over national or local action can be demonstrated. The principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality contained in Article 5 of TEU are 
precisely constructed to tackle this issue by acknowledging the necessity 
of penetrating Union intervention in certain areas.
147
  
To facilitate the anticipated trend of bottom-up convergence, the 
European Commission turned its attention to positively harmonizing not 
the substance, but rather the enforcement mechanisms, which, as will 
become clear, has been a rather disappointing process. Two further moves 
were introduced by the European Commission to accompany the code-
based harmonization efforts. These were the establishment of the 
European Corporate Governance Forum in 2004 and the enshrinement of 
the Comply-or-Explain approach as imposed by Directive 2006/46/EC.
148
 
Under Article 46(a) of the directive, it is compulsory for a listed company 
to include a corporate governance statement in its annual report with 
 
 
 144. WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 141, at 74. 
 145. THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, supra note 144, ch. III.6.; Klaus J. Hopt, Jose Garrido García, 
Jonathan Rickford, Guido Rossi, Jan Schans Christensen, Joelle Simon & Jaap Winter, European 
Corporate Governance in Company Law and Codes, ch. 1 (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://www 
.ecgi.org/presidency/pre sentations/2004_thehague_final_report.pdf. 
 146. E.g., Giandomenico Majone, From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and 
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y 139 (1997). 
 147. See Michael Dougan, And Some Fell on Stoney Ground—A Review of Giandomenico 
Majone’s Dilemmas of European Integration, 31 EUR. L. REV. 865 (2006). 
 148. Council Directive 2006/46/, 2006 O.J. (L 224) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:224:0001:0007:EN:PDF. 
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reference to the national corporate governance code to which the company 
is subject.
149
 While directives and recommendations continue to be 
introduced in specific areas, the code-based approach supported by 
mandatory application of the comply-or-explain principle is now scholarly 
termed “procedural harmonization,”150 and it operates as the major 
European approach to corporate governance.
151
 
2. Doubts on Comply-or-Explain and Procedural Harmonization 
The concept of comply-or-explain that underpins procedural 
harmonization initiatives first came to prominence in 1992 and is marked 
by the release of the Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance.
152
 It became mandatory in 2000 in the UK via the 
listing rules of the Financial Services Authority before it was introduced 
into the European corporate governance framework.
153
 One impetus 
behind the EU espousal of this system was to relieve businesses from 
regulatory burdens and bureaucracy imposed by early efforts towards 
Europeanization.
154
 Under Article 46(a) of Directive 2006/46/EC, 
companies are entitled to derogate from the principles explicated in the 
codes if clear explanations can be offered in annual reports for such 
derogation, which stands in sharp contrast to mandatory systems.
155
 
Compared with mandatory legislation, this comply-or-explain approach 
can better accommodate companies’ individual circumstances, particularly 
the size and complexity of the company and the nature of the risks and 
challenges it faces.
156
 Allowing consideration of the dynamic divergence 
 
 
 149. Id. art. 46(a). 
 150. Armour, supra note 8, at 7; Deakin, supra note 12, at 190. 
 151. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, STUDY ON MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES IN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE MEMBER STATES 11 (Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter RISKMETRICS 
GROUP], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-
explain-090923_en.pdf; WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 141, at 74. 
 152. COMM. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE REPORT, supra note 102. 
 153. RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 22. 
 154. The growing sense of regulatory fatigue among companies and other interested bodies was 
formally acknowledged by the European Commission in the 2006 Review of the Action Plan 
consultation. See Directorate General for Internal Market and Servs., Eur. Comm’n, Consultation on 
Future Priorities for the Action Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
company/docs/consultation/consultation_en.pdf; THE EU APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—
ESSENTIALS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 53. 
 155. Directive 2006/46, supra note 148, art. 46(a). 
 156. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 4–5 (2012) [hereinafter 
UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE], available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/ 
Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx. 
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and complexity of corporate practices, justified non-compliance 
encourages directors to modify their governance strategies and approaches 
in the light of evolving circumstances, and the flow and quality of 
information provided in the explanation can assist shareholders in 
appreciating the soundness of managerial decisions and pressing for a 
strategic change if they are not satisfied.
157
 
Taking account of the disappointing results of previous substantive 
harmonization measures, this soft approach has been preferred by EU 
regulators since 2002 because it “fits well with the differences between 
national legal and governance frameworks,” as well as “the variety of 
situations of individual companies.”158 From a practical perspective, there 
is a mandatory rule to either comply or explain, but the alternative of 
explaining non-compliance turns the actual governance guidelines 
contained in the Codes into optional rules.
159
 It was also hoped that a 
constant flow of information regarding corporate practices might be 
assured via the implementation of this approach, providing a foundation 
for further legislation at the EU level.
160
 Contemplating its anticipated 
advantages in comparison with mandatory systems, it came to prominence 
as the foundation of the new flexible EU corporate governance framework 
and was seen as the key to attaining long-term harmonization in the 
field.
161
 
The EU’s experience with the comply-or-explain approach, however, 
again challenges the effectiveness of the Union’s integration activities 
regarding corporate governance. It further proves the point that a good 
national rule for corporate governance does not necessarily work as 
efficiently at the European level. Before being adopted into the EU 
corporate governance framework, the comply-or-explain approach was 
known as “the trademark of corporate governance in the UK,”162 and it has 
been in place since the beginning of voluntary codes. In the United 
Kingdom, where the comply-or-explain principle originated and has 
flourished, the approach has been well received by businesses and is 
 
 
 157. Sridhar Arcot, Valentina Bruno & Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Corporate Governance in the 
UK: Is the Comply or Explain Approach Working?, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 193–95 (2010). 
 158. See Eur. Corp. Governance Forum, Statement of the European Corporate Governance Forum 
on the Comply-or-explain Principle, § 1 (2006) [hereinafter Eur. Corp. Governance Forum], available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-comply-explain_en.pdf. After 2002, 
there were few mandatory directives in force in the field of corporate governance, the most substantial 
one being the adoption of Council Directive 2007/36, supra note 10.  
 159. DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT 238 (2009). 
 160. RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 22. 
 161. Eur. Corp. Governance Forum, supra note 158. 
 162. UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE, supra note 158, at 4–5. 
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highly praised for its flexibility.
163
 Data also shows satisfactorily high rates 
of compliance with most provisions of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code by companies of all sizes.
164
 When companies do deviate from the 
Code, most manage to clearly set out their reasons and the arrangements 
that they put in place to provide alternative safeguards.
165
 The efficiency 
of the comply-or-explain principle has been nevertheless challenged ever 
since its arrival in European law. Recent studies described by the Green 
Paper cast doubt on its efficacy as an EU policy, referring to it as 
“reduc[ing] the efficiency of the EU’s corporate governance framework 
and limit[ing] the system’s usefulness.”166  
Much of the criticism so far has been pinpointed at the inherent flaws 
of comply-or-explain without challenging the unnecessary Union 
regulatory intervention. The flexible code-based system has been 
championed by the UK over the past fifteen years because of the 
prosperity of the UK’s market-based economy and the strong role played 
by the London Stock Exchange as a self-regulatory body.
167
 The comply-
or-explain principle, reflecting its embedded environment, is principally 
based on the strong role played by the market in corporate control, 
primarily disciplining non-compliant companies by lowering their share 
prices.
168
 This market-based economic background and self-regulatory 
tradition are not present in many of the other Member States, which calls 
into question the suitability of this approach in other nations. In practice, 
the sweeping implementation of comply-or-explain across Europe has had 
 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2011—THE 
IMPACT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STEWARDSHIP CODES 11 
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Develop 
ments-in-Corporate-Governance-2011-The-impa.aspx. 
 165. In the 2011 annual survey of compliance of the UK Corporate Governance Code by FTSE 
350 companies, 50% of companies claim full compliance with the Code. 80% comply with all but one 
or two of the Code’s 48 provisions. Id. 
 166. Commission Green Paper, supra note 14, at 18. 
 167. Rules developed by the Stock Exchange are generally far more rigorous than their statutory 
counterparts, and compliance with those rules has been substantive owing to the reputation of the 
Stock Exchange and the UK’s mature and liquid security markets. See R.C. MICHIE, THE LONDON 
STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY 567 (2001); JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THREADNEEDLE STREET: THE DEREGULATION AND REREGULATION OF BRITAIN’S FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 24–26 (1993). 
 168. Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with 
the Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 486, 487 (2006); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK 
AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, supra note 9; Anita Anand, Voluntary vs. Mandatory Corporate 
Governance: Towards an Optimal Regulatory Framework, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 229 (2006). In the 
wake of the current crisis, the comply-or-explain approach may also appear less appealing to UK 
shareholders in terms of alleviating the principal-agent conflict because of the stronger role of the 
board under this approach than its counterpart under the default rules in UK company law. 
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a more disruptive effect on national enforcement systems, which were 
established and operated in a coherent manner before the community 
measure. In over 60% of deviations, the principle has been abused by 
companies failing to provide sufficient explanation when they chose not to 
apply recommendations from the codes; “they either simply stated that 
they had departed from a recommendation without any further 
explanation, or they provided only a general or limited explanation.”169 It 
was suspected that many companies supported the comply-or-explain 
concept merely because they could easily get away with deviations.
170
 
With regard to the requirement of the German Corporate Governance 
Code to disclose the remuneration of company executive directors on an 
individual basis, only a small minority of firms (10 out of 126 in a 2002 
sample and 22 out of 146 in a 2003 sample) actually complied with the 
suggestion.
171
 
The efficiency of the comply-or-explain principle in European 
harmonization becomes even more questionable because the EU mandates 
the implementation, yet fails to cater for the complementary need for 
proper monitoring and disciplining mechanisms. This issue, according to 
Article 60(a) of the directive, is tackled by way of “self-governance” in 
Member States, which generates a multifaceted picture.
172
 A number of 
different schemes have so far been employed by Member States in 
applying the comply-or-explain idea, including: assimilating into the local 
listing rules,
173
 self-embodiment in the codes,
174
 or enshrining in a mixture 
of public and private regulations—the listing rules make reference to the 
code and the law, whilst securities regulation imposes the comply-or-
explain approach.
175
 To add to this complexity, national implementation 
methods are further differentiated by ambits of national codes customized 
for diverse company types. Currently, some Member States have specific 
corporate governance codes tailored to small and medium-sized listed 
 
 
 169. Commission Green Paper, supra note 14, at 18. 
 170.  Although companies which fail to comply with the recommendations are expected to submit 
explanation of non-compliance, the overall level of “informative explanations” is rather low in the EU. 
Only thirty-nine percent of all explanations on the reference corporate governance code are classified 
as sufficiently “informative”. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 13. 
 171. Christian Andres & Erik Theissen, Setting a Fox to Keep the Geese—Does the Comply-or-
Explain Principle Work?, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 289 (2008). 
 172. Directive 2006/46, supra note 148, art. 60(a). 
 173. E.g., Denmark, Ireland, and Romania. 
 174. E.g., Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. 
 175. E.g., Austria, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the United 
Kingdom. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 24. 
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companies.
176
 In other jurisdictions, however, codes are designed to apply 
to all listed companies, with specific provisions devoted to smaller 
companies.
177
 Local differences in the application of the comply-or-
explain approach inevitably lead to diverse enforcement results, and 
thereby contribute to the continuing fragmented landscape of European 
corporate governance.  
This discrepancy in application resulting from the national filtering 
process is particularly evident in cases involving a company that is 
incorporated in one Member State but whose shares are listed in one or 
more other Member States. For example, in the case of the Netherlands, 
the obligation to adopt the comply-or-explain approach is embodied in 
company law and is applicable to all domestic companies listed in a 
regulated market relying on the criterion of place of incorporation (the 
statutory seat).
178
 Conversely, the comply-or-explain regime in some other 
Member States (e.g. the United Kingdom) is found in the Listing Rules 
and applies to all companies listed in the jurisdiction, regardless of their 
places of incorporation.
179
 This leads to the practical effect that a company 
may suffer a double blow from both the country of incorporation (the 
statutory seat) and the country in which it is listed. Likewise, the 
possibility exists that a company incorporated in one Member State that 
applies listing rules and listed in another that applies the comply-or-
explain approach on the basis of incorporation may be bound by neither 
jurisdiction to apply the local code.
180
 Although practice over the past few 
years suggests that only a limited number of such “forum shopping” 
situations exist, the likelihood of EU companies’ ability to completely 
circumvent procedural harmonization largely undermines any efforts 
toward convergence. 
So far, two suggestions to resolve the issues in complex listing 
situations have been proposed by the European Corporate Governance 
Forum. The suggestions are that a company with cross-border share listing 
should have the discretion as well as the obligation to choose which code 
it intends to apply in the light of its own particular circumstances. The 
 
 
 176. See, e.g., Code de Gouvernement D’entreprise pour les Valeurs Moyennes et Petites, 
MIDDLENEXT (Dec. 2009), http://www.middlenext.com/IMG/pdf/Code_de_gouvernance_site.pdf.  
 177. E.g., UK Corporate Governance Code, supra note 158. In Austria, Ireland, Slovakia, or the 
United Kingdom, a different practical implementation of the code results in fewer applicable 
recommendations for smaller companies. Commission Green Paper, supra note 14, at 4; RISKMETRICS 
GROUP, supra note 151, at 25. 
 178. RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 29. 
 179. Id.; see also Eur. Corp. Governance Forum, supra note 158.  
 180. RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 29. 
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Member State whose code is not chosen can require the company to 
explain in what significant ways the actual corporate practices of that 
company deviate from those set out in that Member State’s corporate 
governance codes.
181
 These suggestions should resolve the difficulty of no 
rule being applicable to a company, although the choice would be left to 
the company, which potentially increases the risk of forum shopping. 
Meanwhile, it remains doubtful whether these suggestions will reduce the 
probability of double code application. According to the suggestions, a 
company may presumably still be disciplined for failing to explain areas of 
disobedience within the code it chooses not to apply, the result being the 
same as applying both codes simultaneously to the same company. 
3. Contesting Procedural Harmonization from a Practical Point of 
View—Continuing Diversities across Member States 
The inspiration behind the EU’s push towards procedural 
harmonization, i.e. a harmonized framework via substantial integration of 
individual codes, can be traced back to the theory of regulatory 
competition put forward by “race to the top” advocates.182 In their 
analysis, law can also be seen as a product in a market for regulatory 
regimes, and diverse systems of rules will eventually converge via a 
process of national legislatures competing to attract firms.
183
 Reflecting 
business demands, moderate but not excessive competition among national 
laws and rules is seen as promoting regulatory innovations, accelerating 
the integration of European corporate laws towards an aggregation of best 
practices, and subsequently progressing towards a “bottom-up” 
convergence across the European Union.
184
 
 
 
 181. Eur. Corp. Governance Forum, supra note 158. Another weakness of these suggestions, 
although it is not particularly relevant to the theme of EU harmonization, is that they are restricted to 
resolving the issue of complex listing situations from a European viewpoint, neglecting discrepancies 
between EU Member State and non-Member States. 
 182. For instance, it is argued that the Centros decision, Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-
og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, has contributed to European corporate governance 
development as it implies the possibility of regulatory competition within the European Union. See, 
e.g., Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path 
Dependence, 13 EUR. J. L. ECON. 47, 50 (2002); cf. Janeen Carruthers & Charlotte Villiers, Company 
Law in Europe—Condoning the Continental Drift?, 11 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 91, 92 (2000). Carruthers 
and Villiers have pointed out that the question of mutual recognition was not approved by the ECJ in 
Centros, rather, “the reality is that the decision brings this debate to the forefront”. Id. 
 183. Roberta Romano, The States as Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Deakin, supra note 12, at 216–
17. 
 184. Siems, supra note 5. 
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For the purposes of this article, we need not engage in seeking answers 
about the contentious topic of whether regulatory competition will 
occur.
185
 What does need acknowledgment, however, is that the presumed 
convergence will occur as a by-product of competition between national 
legislatures, which aim to attract firms to become subject to their laws. In 
other words, convergence will be triggered by firms’ preferences rather 
than by a vertical imposition of laws working towards unification. This 
renders the EU’s imposition of the comply-or-explain principle—i.e. the 
mandatory application of national codes—largely redundant from a 
theoretical point of view. When the envisaged convergence rests entirely 
on the basis of voluntary modifications of laws, why do we need further 
Union mandates to complicate the picture? 
From a practical point of view, observation of the regulatory 
integration status casts further doubt on procedural harmonization and 
even on the prospect of regulatory competition. In the US, where 
regulatory competition is thought to be common practice, there is 
conflicting evidence regarding the large-scale occurrence of regulatory 
competition and convergence.
186
 In Europe, the practice in the years since 
the Centros decision
187
 has proved that the anticipated “legislation 
shopping” that was feared as a result of increased corporate mobility has 
been largely overwhelmed by the persistence of Member States’ domestic 
competitive advantages, including skilled workforces, infrastructure, and 
proximity to natural resources.
188
 No significant sign has been found of 
national rules regarding corporate governance “competing and 
 
 
 185. The arguments in favor of the “race to the top” idea are not without their challengers. In 
particular, the possibility remains that such regulation competition will also lead to the possibility of 
jurisdictions reducing the standards of regulation to a low and inefficient level via a progressive 
dismantling of regulations, i.e. the so-called “race to the bottom.” See, e.g., William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Aallen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from 
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999). 
 186. For example, some evidence suggests that firms are more likely to remain in their home state, 
even when this implies inefficient decisions. Armour, supra note 8, at 12; Robert Daines, The 
Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1596–97 (2002); M. Kahan, The 
Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection (N.Y. 
Univ. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 04-015, 2004). 
 187. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. A 
necessary condition for the realization of regulatory competition is the free movement of companies. 
For further discussion, see Andrew Johnson & Phil Syrpis, Regulatory Competition in European 
Company Law after Cartesio, 34 EUR. L. REV. 378 (2009); Amit M. Sachdeva, Regulatory 
Competition in European Company Law, EUR. J. L & ECON. 137, 138 (2010); Armour, supra note 8. 
 188. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 432, 2003), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ 
papers/pdf/432.pdf. 
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converging.”189 With regard to the central themes characterizing the 
dichotomous models of corporate governance—namely, ownership and 
control—fascinating diversities in terms of both structural and practical 
aspects are still exhibited in European countries, despite an emerging 
common understanding of the significance of corporate governance and 
various harmonizing efforts over the past decades. In particular, 
differences can be perceived in terms of the following three key aspects: 
differences in board performance and structure, the rights and composition 
of the shareholder body, and the allocation of power between shareholders 
and directors. This indicates the inefficiency of procedural harmonization 
and tentatively suggests the limited prospect of regulatory approximation 
arising out of competition between national codes. 
a. Differences at Board Level 
With regard to board functions, although the EU introduced a 
Recommendation to clarify the role of boards of directors and 
committees,
190
 its implementation so far has been rather discouraging. 
After six years, some Member States have yet to include the main 
principles in their codes of practice, and a few other Member States have 
simply chosen not to accept the key provisions in the 
Recommendations.
191
 
Board sizes and the criteria employed to assess directors’ practices also 
vary greatly between different corporate governance frameworks, which to 
a degree depend on the presence of employee representatives on the 
board.
192
 In Member States operating under the Anglo-American model, a 
board is seen as having sole responsibility and accountability towards the 
residual claimants of the company—the shareholders. The maximization 
of benefits for shareholders, usually measured by quarter earnings of 
companies, is the paramount criterion for evaluating directors’ 
performance: “The sole common interest of all shareholders is the ongoing 
prosperity of the company. . . . By elevating environmental and social 
considerations to the same level as the creation of wealth the concept of 
 
 
 189. A Triandafyllidou & A Fotiou, Sustainability and Modernity in the European Union: A 
Frame Theory Approach to Policy-Making, 3 SOC. RESEARCH ONLINE 6.2 (1998). 
 190. Commission Recommendation on the Role of Non-executive or Supervisory Directors of 
Listed Companies and on the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board, 2005 O.J. (L 52) 51, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:052:0051:0063:EN:PDF. 
 191. RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 32. 
 192. Id. at 31. 
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accountability is undermined.”193 In countries featuring the Continental 
system, the central concern of corporate governance is defined not by the 
rights of the shareholders in relation to the managers, but rather, by the 
rights of the community in relation to the corporation itself.
194
 
“Shareholders alone cannot make a firm—creditors, employees, managers, 
and even local governments often must make contributions in order for an 
enterprise to succeed.”195 By emphasizing the alignment of various 
stakeholders’ interests in evaluation standards and the involvement of 
stakeholders in supervisory boards, managing directors in Continental 
countries focus on longer-term corporate development strategies.
196
 
b. Shareholder Rights and Composition  
The most substantial harmonization achievement has been the adoption 
of a Directive on shareholder rights (Directive 2007/36), prior to which the 
sphere of shareholder rights had long been dominated by diverse national 
rules.
197
 Although, admittedly, the Directive singles out certain core rules 
to be adopted across Europe, e.g., requirements regarding transparency 
and the information disclosed by issuers, it is not sufficient (and not 
intended) to supersede national disparities in shareholder rights. The 
Directive only lays down the minimum rights of shareholders concerning 
voting at general meetings, such as the right to information and the right to 
ask questions, most of which are already commonly acknowledged and 
implemented by national rules, albeit in different forms. Issues that are 
less than completely agreed upon, such as the role of intermediaries in the 
voting process, the possibility and means of shareholders putting items on 
the agenda of the general meeting, and the voting rights of institutional 
investors, are either to be included in the form of voluntary 
recommendations introduced independently of the Directive or completely 
left out of the harmonizing process.
198
 Even when enforcing the basic rules 
 
 
 193. Henry Bosch, The Changing Face of Corporate Governance, 25 U.N.S.W L. J. 270, 290 
(2002). 
 194. BROOKINGS INST., EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 164 (Margaret M. Blair & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
 195. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-so-bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1189, 1195 (2002), available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~usclrev/pdf/075504.pdf. 
 196. See Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labour, and the Firm: A Study of German 
Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863 (2004). 
 197. Council Directive 2007/36, supra note 10; see also HANNIGAN, supra note 65, at 42. 
 198. Eur. Comm’n, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders’ Rights—Third 
Consultation Document of the Services of the Directorate General Internal Market and Services, 
MARKT/ 30.04.2007, at 2 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ 
shareholders/consultation3_en.pdf; Eur. Comm’n., Synthesis of the Comments on the Third 
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enshrined in the Directive, Member States are left with a wide margin of 
flexibility and maintain the scope to retain their own dynamics, e.g., the 
freedom of the Chairman to reject questions during the meeting and the 
delineation of detailed measures allowing shareholders to ask questions 
related to items on the agenda. 
Key findings regarding the extent of share ownership among the 
populations of various countries also indicate different profiles of 
shareholders in corporate governance and the varying degrees of capital 
market influence in different national corporate governance contexts. In 
the UK, the primary representative of the Anglo-American system, the 
percentage of share owners among the adult population has remained 
steady at over 20 percent within the period 1997 to 2002, while the 
proportion of shareholders aged over fourteen within the German 
population in the same period was significantly lower—around 6–8 
percent.
199
 
c. Distribution of Power 
Irreconcilable differences concerning the core feature of corporate 
control—the distribution of power—are revealed in European corporate 
governance despite decades of enforced reforms. At the shareholder-
oriented extreme, e.g., in the United Kingdom, the core issues of corporate 
governance are not regulated by corporate laws, but are left to the 
discretion of company shareholders that decide in the form of articles of 
association, on the basis that this will allow more freedom for business 
management. Shareholders are free to choose as they see fit the size and 
the composition of the board and the extent of power allocation. Directors 
are supposedly “responsible for the management of the company’s 
business,”200 indicating that in terms of governing the company, the 
powers of directors in the UK are allocated by the shareholder body and 
are subject to subsequent shareholder control.
201
 In contrast, systems at the 
other extreme, represented by German law, do not allow shareholders 
 
 
Consultation Document of the Internal Market and Services Directorate-General, at 2 (2007), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/consultation3_report_en 
.pdf. 
 199. AUSTL. STOCK EXCHANGE, INTERNATIONAL SHARE OWNERSHIP 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.asx.com.au/documents/resources/international_share_ownership_summary_05.pdf. 
 200. The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations, 2009, S.I. 2008/3229, art. 3 (U.K.).  
 201. According to section 21 of the Companies Act 2006, Articles of Association can only be 
changed by shareholders by means of special resolution. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 21 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf. 
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significant room to devise governance strategies, nor do they have the 
ultimate power to do so. According to section 119 of the German Stock 
Corporation Act, the shareholder body can “only make management 
decisions when asked to do so by the management board,” indicating that 
the controlling power of the board in Germany does not stem from 
shareholders’ allocation, and shareholders do not have as much corporate 
control as their UK counterparts.
202
 
Such diversity regarding the balance of power allocation leads to 
structural and behavioral distinctions between boards under distinct 
models of corporate governance as well. Narrow latitude is favored in 
Anglo-American practice, which uses internal mechanisms to ensure the 
company’s accountability to shareholders and to harmonize “the 
relationship between shareholders and their companies.”203 A one-tier (or 
unitary) board composed of both executive and non-executive directors is 
the prevalent form of management under the Anglo-American system.
204
 
Directors’ accountability to the shareholders depends heavily upon the 
ability of the shareholders to review the performance of the board and to 
make decisions if they think the performance has been inadequate.
205
 On 
the other hand, the broader view adopted in Continental practice sees the 
function of the board as a means to coordinate the web of relationships 
within a company, including the relationships between the company and 
its extensive range of stakeholders.
206
 In countries featuring the 
Continental system, for instance Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, a 
two-tier (or dual) board structure composed of both supervisory and 
management boards is mandatory for large public companies. The 
supervisory board oversees the direction of the business, while the 
 
 
 202. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBL. I at 1089, last amended 
by Restrukturierungsgesetz [German Restructuring Act], Dec 9, 2010, BGBL. I at 1900, art. 6 (Ger.).  
 203. R.A. DERWENT & J.M. JONES, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HANDBOOK: SUPPLEMENT 1 
ON OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW (1996). 
 204. See, e.g., Lucian Cernat, The Emerging European Corporate Governance Model: Anglo-
Saxon, Continental, or Still the Century of Diversity?, J. EUR. PUBLIC POL’Y 147, 150 (2004); Klaus J. 
Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, Board Models in Europe—Recent Development of Internal Corporate 
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, 1 EUR. COMP. FIN. L. 
REV. 135 (2005); Carsten Jungmann, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in One-Tier and 
Two-Tier Board Systems—Evidence from the UK and Germany, 3 EUR. COMP. FIN. L. REV. 426 
(2007). 
 205. For example, in the UK, shareholders have the right to appoint and remove directors. See 
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/ 
pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf (describing the dismissal of directors). There is no express provision as 
to how directors are appointed in the Companies Act 2006, but it is provided in the Model Articles 
(Companies Regulation 2008) that a director may be appointed by ordinary resolution of shareholders. 
DAVIES, WORTHINGTON, GOWER & MICHELER, supra note 9, at 411–12. 
 206. See JILL SOLOMON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 12 (2d ed. 2007). 
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management board is responsible for the management of the business.
207
 A 
co-determination system is often employed in this dual structure, in which 
employees, as a significant group of stakeholders, may have representation 
on the supervisory board. For instance, it is mandatory for most German 
public companies to have up to half the supervisory board members 
elected by employees.
208
 After decades of extensive discussion, the 
superiority of the structure of the board still remains in dispute,
209
 and the 
marked distinction between one-tier and two-tier boards is still 
demonstrated among Member States in spite of the EU’s long-standing 
harmonization efforts. At the time of writing, nine Member States employ 
unitary structures, eight use dual structures, another eight employ both, 
and the remaining two, Italy and Hungary, allow so-called “hybrid” 
structures.
210
 
V. CONTESTING THE FEASIBILITY OF EUROPEAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE HARMONIZATION—THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The foregoing discussions raise serious doubts about the effectiveness 
of EU legislative efforts to actively create a harmonized corporate 
governance framework. This section will attempt to further argue against 
the feasibility of European harmonization in the realm of corporate 
governance from a theoretical perspective. On these theoretical grounds, it 
seems better to leave corporate governance out of the harmonization 
scheme, leaving it to the governance of national rules and the “invisible 
hand” of markets.  
 
 
 207. CHRISTINE MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 122 (2d ed. 2007). In the two-tier board 
system, the term “board” is often used to refer to the supervisory board, while the term “key 
executives” refers to the management board. See OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF 
OECD COUNTRIES 15, 88 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernance 
principles/21755678.pdf. 
 208. Under the German Co-Determination Act 1976, public companies and partnerships limited 
by shares with more than two thousand employees should have a supervisory board consisting of an 
even number of members (twelve, sixteen, or twenty, depending on the total number of employees), 
equally divided between shareholder and employee representatives. MitbestG [Co-Determination Act], 
May 4, 1976, BGBL. I at 1153. 
 209. E.g., Paul L. Davies, Board Structure in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Continuing 
Divergence?, 2 INT’L & COMP. CORP. L. J. 423 (2000); GREGORY FRANCESCO MAASSEN, AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS, A STUDY ON THE FORMAL 
INDEPENDENCE AND CONVERGENCE OF ONE-TIER AND TWO-TIER CORPORATE BOARDS OF 
DIRECTORS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE NETHERLANDS 
(2000), available at http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/repub/asset/8028/Maassen_9789090125916.pdf; Hopt, 
supra note 47. 
 210. “There is no formal obligation” in Lithuania to have a board of directors, although practice 
shows that both forms of boards are employed. RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 151, at 32. 
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A. Contractual Connections Underlying the Corporate Context 
Viewed from an economic perspective, the flexibility and diversity of 
the contractual agreements underpinning different corporations, as will be 
presented below, causes problems for the harmonization of corporate 
governance mandated by EU-level actions. Over the thirty years that have 
elapsed since Easterbrook and Fischel advanced the idea originally 
proposed by aggregate activists,
211
 this contractual nature of corporations 
is mostly employed in the long-standing corporate objective debate in the 
field of corporate governance to justify the predominance of shareholder 
value maximization,
212
 though its implications for the convergence debate 
have been less examined. 
Resting on the existence of contractual relationships among 
constituencies in corporate business, the concept of a “company,” 
according to this theory, is a voluntary venture with complex arrangements 
among participants who are connected by contracts.
213
 Corporate 
constituencies agree upon the terms by which they are prepared to supply 
the corporation with input and by which they expect to be compensated for 
so doing; hence, the company is also referred to as a “nexus of 
contracts.”214 The terms contained in relevant contracts shape the 
governance and compensation devices available in different firms, which 
differ in conjunction with the diversity of economic activity carried on 
within corporations and the varied identities of the constituencies.
215
 
Regarding the rich diversity of corporate contracts, Easterbrook and 
Fischel wrote, to give succinct examples: “Corporations sometimes are 
organized as hierarchies, with the higher parts of the pyramid issuing 
commands; sometimes they are organized as dictatorships; sometimes they 
are organized as divisional profit centers with loose or missing 
hierarchy.”216 Processes of contracting are primarily carried out on the 
basis of party autonomy and coordinated by the “invisible hand.” If 
investors, as well as employees and other interested parties, are of the view 
 
 
 211. See ALAN DIGNAM & JOHN LOWRY, COMPANY LAW 376–88 (6th ed. 2010); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). 
 212. E.g., CLARKE, supra note 2, at 149; Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the 
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Andrew Keay, supra note 99; John Parkinson, Models of the 
Company and the Employment Relationship, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 481 (2003). 
 213. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 211, at 1426. 
 214. Fama, supra note 212, at 290; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 211, at 1426; Michael C. 
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). 
 215. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 211, at 1426. 
 216. Id. at 1426–27. 
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that the way entrepreneurs manage the potential investee company will 
reduce their expected returns, they will either purchase the shares after a 
corresponding reduction in share price is made, or they will simply invest 
in some other firm.
217
 “In general, all the terms in corporate governance 
are contractual in the sense that they are fully priced in transactions among 
the interested parties,”218 and they continue to change under rapid market 
variations. The integrated contractual nexus defines the flexible nature of 
corporate governance—the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.
219
 It requires acute commercial awareness and sufficient 
discretionary powers for company managers to reflect on the constantly 
evolving business reality and, accordingly, modify corporate governance 
terms in short time. Therefore, it is undesirable to restrict company 
managers through rigid legislative instruments seeking to harmonize 
corporate governance practices.
220
 The role of regulations and laws in this 
field, in contrast to ones of a public nature, is best confined to filling gaps 
and balancing irregular bargaining powers so that parties can move closest 
to an ideal agreement, i.e. the agreement the parties would have reached 
with “full information and costless contracting.”221 
Although there remains some controversy as to what content and form 
the preferred rules should have, in practice, the relationships accruing to 
corporate governance under the Member States’ laws are flexibly defined, 
which at least superficially accords with the theory. Upon the fulfillment 
of fundamental duties of care, skill, and diligence, great autonomy is 
granted to central management, which typically assumes the operations of 
the corporation; this is a characteristic of all large corporations and is 
exemplified in corporate governance practices across Member States.
222
 
 
 
 217. According to this argument, what distinguishes shareholders from other stakeholder groups is 
their identity as risk-bearers—once contracts are formed, all other stakeholders’ returns are somehow 
guaranteed by contracts. Shareholders provide their capital for an open-ended return and the value of 
their claim varies depending on whatever is left over after all the other constituencies’ interests have 
been fulfilled through contractual claims. It is only logical that shareholders should be the only 
residual claimant group in the company, and they should be rewarded with the entitlement to the 
entirety of any excess profit that the firm may generate. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 9; 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L & ECON. 425, 437 
(1993). 
 218. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 211, at 1430. 
 219. Comm. on Corp. Governance Report, supra note 102. 
 220. For arguments against mandatory state intervention in corporate performance, see Henry N. 
Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 99 (1989); Jonathan 
R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules against Insider Trading, 13 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider 
Trading, 35 STANFORD L. REV. 857 (1983). 
 221. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 211, at 1433. 
 222. See ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: TEXT AND 
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The scope of management discretion is even more extensive in Anglo-
American system countries where market forces traditionally assume a 
strong role in corporate control. In the UK, ultimate corporate governance 
concerns, including the distribution of powers between the shareholder 
body and directors and the appointment and removal of directors, are 
entirely left to the discretion of shareholders in individual companies, 
rather than being statutorily governed by the comprehensive Companies 
Act 2006.
223
 It is also a tradition to grant directors extensive discretion in 
corporate decision-making, and courts tend “not [to] judge directors with 
the wisdom of hindsight and do not ‘second-guess’ directors on 
commercial matters.”224 The flexible and diverse contractual relationships 
defining the nature of corporations effectively serve to explain the 
autonomy of parties in governance, which give rise to vastly different 
approaches to corporate governance and further hinder the possibility of 
harmonization pressed by the EU as a federal legislator. 
B. Path Dependence and Complementarity 
As stated by Yoshikawa and Rasheed, “A better understanding of the 
relative intransigence of national governance systems is not possible 
without an examination of the factors that impede convergence.”225 The 
goal of a harmonized framework, even from a long-term developmental 
perspective, is theoretically undermined by arguments related to path 
dependence and complementarity—two primary factors underpinning the 
persistence of contextual factors in domestic corporate governance 
 
 
CASES ON THE LAWS GOVERNING CORPORATIONS IN GERMANY, THE UK AND THE USA 10 (2010). It 
remains a matter of dispute as to who should have the ultimate power of control in a corporation and 
also whom a corporation should serve. For a rich collection of literature in these fields, see, e.g., R. 
EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); ALFRED D. 
CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); 
Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); Dodd, supra 
note 68; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003). For the purpose of this article, those issues will not be explored. 
 223. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.). 
 224. Law Comm. and Scottish L. Comm., Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests 
and Formulating a Statement of Duties, § 5.28 (1999), available at http://hb.betterregulation.com/exter 
nal/Company%20Director.pdf. When assessing whether directors have breached the fiduciary duty of 
acting in the interest of the company, the English court will consider, in the opinion of the directors 
rather than in the Court’s own opinion, whether directors acted in the bona fide interests of the 
company. BIRDS ET AL., supra note 78, at 615; DEREK FRENCH, STEPHEN W. MAYSON & 
CHRISTOPHER L. RYAN, MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON COMPANY LAW 455 (24th ed. 2007); see also 
In Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd., [1942] EWHC (Ch) 304 (Eng.); Regentcrest plc v. Cohen, [2001] 2 
B.C.L.C. 80. 
 225. Yoshikawa & Rasheed, supra note 94, at 392. 
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practices.
 
Originating in the 1980s,
226
 the concept of path dependence has 
been increasingly utilized in recent years by scholars in various 
disciplines, including economics,
227
 corporate governance,
228
 and law,
229
 in 
explaining the persisting properties of their subjects. 
The original definition of path dependence refers to a situation under 
which the current state of a system is determined and “locked in” not only 
by its initial conditions, but also by the evolutionary path it took.
230
 In the 
field of corporate governance, this theory offers a convincing explanation 
for the persisting properties of differing national models by drawing on the 
influence of historical, political, cultural, and other contextual elements in 
various countries, thereby challenging the view that corporate governance 
systems in individual economies are likely to move towards the same end 
at a rapid pace.
231
 In the case of the EU, persisting structural, economic, 
and political differences result in the emergence of gaps between 
coordination and institutional capacity in Member States which, being 
further exposed by the current economic and debt crisis, are likely to 
threaten of the harmonization of European corporate governance.
232
 
The phenomenon of path dependence may arise from a number of 
aspects in practice. From the structurally-driven point of view,
233
 sunk 
 
 
 226. The first known use of the term “path dependence” in reference to the feature of persistence 
was by David in his article “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.” P.A. David, Clio and the 
Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985); see also Shuangge Wen & Jingchen Zhao, 
Exploring the Rationale of Enlightened Shareholder Value in the Realm of UK Company Law—The 
Path Dependence Perspective, 14 INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 153, 162 (2011). 
 227. E.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and 
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).  
 228. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (2000). 
 229. E.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in 
Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998). 
 230. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 
(2005); Yoshikawa & Rasheed, supra note 94, at 392; Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path 
Dependence, Corporate Governance and Complementarity, 5 INT’L FIN. 311, 314–16 (2002). 
 231. See Schmidt & Spindler, supra note 230; Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 228; Liebowitz & 
Margolis, supra note 227; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, supra note 94. 
 232. According to recent research results, the major causes of the European debt crises vary by 
country. For instance, the crises in Ireland and Spain were mainly triggered by defaults in the private 
sector, while in Greece and Portugal, the cyclically adjusted structural deficit was among the major 
causes. See Jerome L. Stein, The Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe, 31 CATO J. 199 (2011), available 
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj31n2/cj31n2-2.pdf.  
 233. Here we follow the categorization method put forward by Bebchuk and Roe: path 
dependence effects can be perceived from two major aspects, namely structural and rule-driven. See 
Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 228. 
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costs are a major impediment to national harmonizing adaptations, where 
improving any single element individually may actually reduce efficiency 
and make switching more costly.
234
 One example is the long-standing 
dominance of the stakeholder-friendly philosophy in German corporate 
practices. The predominance of this characteristic was based upon and 
relies on the existence and support of a number of structural elements, 
including but not limited to: the comprehensive legal regime of co-
determination, restrictions on the distribution of dividends, and corporate 
stock repurchases.
235
 Structural path dependence can also be triggered by 
rent-seeking incentives or loss-averse concerns of relevant constituencies, 
which lead to their inclination towards persistence.
236
 In Klausner’s terms, 
the human capital of lawyers and judges is complementary to the existing 
national system governing corporations’ behaviors and because adapting to 
the EU standard could potentially devalue their existing legal knowledge, 
they will be disinclined to support the adjustments.
237
 Existing literature 
has also extended the reach of such rent-seeking behavior by 
demonstrating that resistance can come from a wide range of actors, 
including “labor unions, banks, controlling shareholders, lawyers.”238 
The rule-driven aspect of path dependence, which can be simplified as 
“history matters;”239 or the idea of “lock-in by historical events”240 
alternatively focuses on the preserving effect of the evolutionary path a 
system took. Initial structures of legal systems, including corporate law, 
rules governing corporate governance, labor relations, and insolvency are 
found to have a vast influence on the formation of subsequent structures, 
 
 
 234. Id.; Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional 
Complementarity, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 657 (1994); Khanna, Kogan & Palepu, supra note 87, at 71. 
 235. See, e.g., Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Ownership and Control in the UK, 
Germany, and France, 9 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 30 (1997); Simon Peck & Winfried Ruigrok, Hiding 
behind the Flag? Prospects for Change in German Corporate Governance, 4 EUR. MGMT J. 420 
(2000). 
 236. Khanna, Kogan & Palepu, supra note 87, at 71; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, supra note 94, at 
393. 
 237. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 
757 (1995), cited in Heine & Kerber, supra note 60, at 59; see also Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. 
Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability 
Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464 (1996). 
 238. Yoshikawa & Rasheed, supra note 94, at 393; see also Coffee, supra note 1; Bebchuk & 
Roe, supra note 228; Khanna, Kogan & Palepu, supra note 87. 
 239. See, e.g., Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the “Carriers of History”?: Path Dependence 
and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE ECON. 
DYNAMICS 205 (1994); Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence, Corporate 
Governance and Complementarity, 5 INT’L FIN. 311, 315 (2002). 
 240. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 116 (1989). 
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which tend to assimilate and stabilize the essential elements of initial 
configurations.
241
 For instance, “[t]he early development and high degree 
of industrialisation of the UK economy have . . . facilitated the 
predominance of shareholder value orientation” as the overriding 
corporate objective “in practice.”242 To date, these historical lock-ins have 
occurred even in governance systems characterized by voluntary 
measures,
243
 which indicates that diverse national corporate governance 
elements will continue to exert effects on the process of European 
procedural harmonization. 
Recent scholarship suggests institutional complementarities as a source 
of multiple optima, as well as support for national system persistence.
244
 
Broadly speaking, the entire national corporate governance system is 
complementary to other sets of governance systems, i.e. the whole 
corporate governance system of one country must fit with other national 
characteristics. In light of the fact that partial changes to individual 
elements will not properly fit with the rest of the complementary structural 
elements, the reformed system will resist such changes unless fundamental 
alterations can be made to “the different elements of an economic, social 
and legal system in which governance is embedded.”245  
As a significant external monitoring mechanism of corporate 
governance, the rich diversities among various Member States’ stock 
market developments suggest robust complementary effects and the likely 
persistence of their individual corporate governance systems. The UK 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance system is found to be 
complementary with its liquid market mechanisms and its heavy reliance 
on equity capital. The “market for corporate control” has become “one of 
the most severe disciplinary mechanisms”246 in the UK, exerting 
governance for corporate shareowners, mitigating the agency problem, and 
ensuring the accountability of management.
247
 The emphasis of German 
 
 
 241. Yoshikawa & Rasheed, supra note 94, at 392. 
 242. Wen & Zhao, supra note 226, at 168. For support on the interconnection between 
industrialization and the corporate objective, see Neil Fligstein & Robert Freeland, Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspectives on Corporate Governance, 21 ANN. REV. SOC. 21 (1995).  
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corporations on creditors and employees’ interests is compatible with that 
nation’s economic reality—their stock market is both illiquid and 
volatile.
248
 Undersized and undeveloped capital markets result in high 
dependence on debt and the long-term commitment of capital, which in 
turn brings about the primary position of banks that tend to play multiple 
stakeholder roles in the corporate context.
249
 
Whereas the growth of stock markets in Europe has been subject to 
extensive Union legislative efforts, the pace of change towards eliminating 
the sharp contrasts between the two polar extremes of corporate 
governance is relatively static. Statistics recently published by Eurostat 
usefully illustrate the different sizes and performances of national stock 
markets and the varied importance of investor capital in different 
economies of scale by demonstrating the distinct degree of market 
capitalization of firms (in million Euros) in the bank-based Germany and 
the market-based UK.
 
As shown in Chart 1,
250
 which contains yearly 
figures over the period between 2001 and 2010, the market capitalization 
value in the UK has always been significantly higher than the 
corresponding value in Germany, in all years doubling or more than 
doubling the German value.  
 
 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE: MANAGING THE DRIVERS OF PERFORMANCE 8 (1998); Denis & McConnell, 
supra note 1, at 4; Clarke, supra note 2, at 100–03. 
 248. Coffee, supra note 1, at 663; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, German Corporate 
Governance, and the Transition Costs of Capitalism, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 185, 200 (1998). 
 249. Aguilera & Jackson, supra note 3. In Germany, the role of the banks is not limited to being 
loan capital providers. The so-called “Universalbankensystem” allows an investing bank to act as a 
company’s principal supplier of both debt and equity capital, with its representatives serving on the 
supervisory board of the company. See JONATHAN P. CHARKHAM, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY: A 
STUDY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN FIVE COUNTRIES 35 (1994); Robert Monks, Relationship 
Investing (Ctr. for L. & Econ. Stud., Paper for Conference on Relational Investing of Institutional 
Investor Project, 1993). 
 250. Data extracted from Stock Market Capitalization, EUROSTAT, http://appsso.eurostat.ec 
.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=mny_stk_mcp_a&lang=en (last updated Feb. 22, 2013).  
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CHART I: COMPARISON OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION VALUE IN 
GERMANY AND THE UK (MILLION EUROS) 
Statistics Source: Eurostat: EU Monetary and Other Financial Statistics—Stock Market 
Capitalization 
Accounting for the relative economic importance of stock markets, the 
ratio of total stock market capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP) 
between Germany and the UK also demonstrates sharply disproportionate 
development paths. Typically, German stock market capitalization 
amounted to no more than a small percentage of the German GDP,
 251
 
while the liquid equity trade and mature mechanisms in the UK 
contributed to its high market capitalization ratio. Although changes have 
been noted over the years as to the precise numbers, as will be seen from 
the chart below, the sharp contrast between the two countries persists, and 
this disparity seems to be on the rise. Chart 2 shows the total market 
capitalization of firms in the bank-based Germany and the market-based 
UK, taken as a proportion of GDP over the period 2006 to 2010.
252
 In all 
cases, the UK ratios were more than double the comparative German 
values. These figures raise serious issues against Professor Coffee’s 
convergence-favoring the argument that “securities markets [in Europe] 
 
 
 251. For 1995, German stock market capitalization was 23.9%, but the corresponding ratio was 
130.7% in the United Kingdom. See EUROMONEY, THE 1996 GUIDE TO GERMANY 2, A4, tb1.1 (1996). 
 252. Market Capitalisation of Listed Companies (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.world 
bank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (data extracted from World 
Bank, Standard & Poor's, Global Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P data). 
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are developing and convergence at this level is occurring” notwithstanding 
historical influences and institutional complementarities.
253
 Instead, this 
evidence largely supports the arguments of path dependency theorists, 
who suggest that traditional national patterns, including those of markets, 
would suppress potential convergence stimuli and continue to resist 
substantive changes. To shed further light on the transformation of 
corporate governance systems in EU Member States, it follows that 
fundamental changes towards a harmonized end would not easily take 
place within different frameworks of corporate governance, owing to their 
inseparable systemic complementarities with domestic socio-economic 
factors. 
CHART II: MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF LISTED COMPANIES  
(% OF GDP) IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Statistics Source: World Bank—Market Capitalization of Listed Companies (% of GDP). 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE LANDSCAPE IN THE  
WAKE OF THE CRISIS 
The focus of long-standing theoretical and policy debates, the 
harmonization of corporate governance across Europe, continues to elicit 
public concern in the current climate of economic uncertainty. Reflecting 
on recent calls for further EU legislative moves towards a harmonized 
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corporate governance framework, this paper contradicts the vision of 
further Union-level harmonization of corporate governance, reaching 
pessimistic conclusions regarding both its necessity and its feasibility in 
the post-crisis environment. Significantly, after a close scrutiny of the 
efficiency of harmonization efforts to date at the EU level, and of 
continuing differences in practice, it is clear that overall progress towards 
a single EU corporate governance framework has been sluggish.
254
 This 
can partially be attributed to the flexible nature and blurred boundaries of 
corporate governance as an independent discipline. Although incremental 
changes brought about by legislative efforts are not to be denied in certain 
areas, the point to be considered here is that the extent and scope of these 
changes are not substantial enough to eliminate distinctions among 
national systems, and further EU action in the field of corporate 
governance is also likely to be substantively compromised by different 
national and business agendas and practices of corporate governance.  
The ongoing crisis further complicates the plans for EU corporate 
governance harmonization. On the one hand, further EU action in 
corporate governance with the goal of establishing a harmonized 
framework is evidently seen at the Union level as essential for the revival 
of the economy.
255
 As suggested by the Internal Market Commissioner 
Frits Bolkestein: “The more national corporate governance codes converge 
towards best practice, the easier it will be to restore confidence in capital 
markets in the wake of the scandals that have shaken trust in some 
European companies, including traditional ‘blue chips.’”256 Following the 
report on the responses to the Green Paper about the corporate governance 
framework for listed companies, the Commission has recently adopted an 
Action Plan outlining future initiatives in the areas of company law and 
corporate governance.
257
 
Conversely, an increasing acknowledgement of the difficulties of 
eliminating national discrepancies has led scholars and practitioners to 
fight for more options and flexibility for Member States. “EU 
harmonization should respect the national corporate governance systems 
of the Member States and should strive to further the trend towards 
increased flexibility and freedom of choice in respect of company forms 
 
 
 254. See supra Part IV.B & C.  
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 256. Eur. Comm’n, Corporate Governance: Commission Creates European Forum to Promote 
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=en. 
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and the internal distribution of powers.”258 Responses from a wide range 
of professional representatives, citizens, and public authorities also display 
a generally hostile attitude towards further governance measures at the EU 
level, which will severely impede the EU from gaining the necessary 
support for any further harmonization action.
259
 With regard to certain core 
governance issues, including the power balance within boards and better 
governance of non-listed companies, many respondents opposed the need 
for any EU harmonizing action and maintained that they should be left to 
resolve issues at company level so as to reduce unnecessary costs 
associated with implementation and maintain the integrity and flexibility 
of businesses.
260
  
To make the situation even worse, the continuing vulnerability of the 
Eurozone economies seriously challenges the established balance between 
various Member States in the economic and political partnership.
261
 
“[T]here is little public appetite for ‘more Europe’” at this fragile time 
because of fears of one’s own nation being dragged deeper into the 
crisis.
262
 A reluctant attitude towards further integration can be seen from 
the recent UK government’s pledge to hold an in/out referendum and 
renegotiate the nation’s relationship with the EU.263 The growing variation 
of health among Member State economies and their responses to the 
current crisis will understandably contribute to possible divergence in 
national corporate governance systems. Coupled with the inadequacy of 
existing Union-level approaches to harmonization and the long-standing 
national diversities contextualized by distinctive national structures, 
historical traditions, and value priorities, it appears more feasible and 
desirable in practical terms to envisage an improved variety of governance 
systems, allowing enough flexibility for differences among practices 
between individual Member States. 
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